A Note on the Proposition “Deus est” in Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

This note aims to discuss and develop two interpretations within the framework of the so-called ‘Fregean-Geachean Thomism’ regarding the sense of ‘est’ in the proposition ‘Deus est’ in Thomas Aquinas. The two interpretations are the following : (1) Kenny’s interpretation, which claims that the ‘est’ in ‘Deus est’ must be understood as specific existence (anitas) : ‘there is/ there are …’ ; and (2) Ventimiglia’s interpretation, which claims that ens ut verum (being as true) – the sense of being in which, according to Aquinas, the ‘est’ in ‘Deus est’ should also be understood – is analogous to an assertion sign : ‘it is true/the case that […].’ I will argue that both interpretations can be harmonised within a unified perspective, if situated within the epistemological context of Aquinas’s account and refined with more theoretical and historical accuracy. This will be achieved by introducing the distinction between secundum se and quoad nos, drawing a parallelism with the distinctions between the senses of being (quidditas and anitas), and by highlighting similarities Aquinas sets forth between the way we know that God exists and the way we know that privations, such as blindness, exist.