What remains today of Aristotle's metaphysics?


  • Enrico Berti Università degli Studi di Padova


Aristotle’s metaphysics is entirely original, distinct from all other forms of metaphysics. In particular, it is distinct regarding the formulation of its problem, taking as its object the multiplicity of the senses of being, and regarding the way in which it advances the solution, by indicating four types of cause that are irreducible among themselves. Therefore, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot be targeted by the critique or condemnation that is directed against metaphysics in general. Moreover, because of its attention to multiplicity, variety, differences, and mobility, Aristotle’s metaphysics does not extinguish the problematic character of being and, for that reason, remains extraordinarily current. Of course, it would not make sense today to talk about celestial spheres, eternal movements, and immobile movers. Nonetheless, the problem “what is being?”, “what does being mean?”, and “what does being explain?”, retains importance so long as it is not used to exclude multiplicity, variety, and the problematic character of the world in which we live. The response to the question “what remains today of the metaphysics of Aristotle?” may therefore be the following. In addition to all of the concepts, the distinctions, the definitions, and the theories, treated by Aristotle and still present in contemporary philosophy, there remains an idea of metaphysics that has not yet been plumbed in its specificity and therefore may still be useful today.



How to Cite

Berti, Enrico. “What Remains Today of Aristotle’s Metaphysics?”. Acta Philosophica 15, no. 2 (September 30, 2006): 273–286. Accessed July 24, 2024. https://www.actaphilosophica.it/article/view/4025.