Aristotle and Kant on practical reason: an Annotation to Korsgaard


  • Ana Marta González Universidad de Navarra


Aristotle, Christine M. Korsgaard, Ethics, Kant, Practical Reason


In recent years, scholarship has been calling our attention to the commonalities between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics. In this general trend, Christine Korsgaard has a leading role. Yet, Korsgaard has also acknowledged an obvious difference between both authors: unlike Kant, Aristotle does not think of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather as valuable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation. In other words: they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Nevertheless, Korsgaard keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguing that it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. By contrast, in this paper, I try to argue that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety.




How to Cite

González, Ana Marta. “Aristotle and Kant on Practical Reason: An Annotation to Korsgaard”. Acta Philosophica 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 99–112. Accessed June 25, 2024.