Human Goods and Moral Normativity. G.E.M. Anscombe's Critique of the Concept of “Moral ought”

Authors

  • José María Torralba Universidad de Navarra, Departamento de Filosofía

Keywords:

G.E.M. Anscombe, Normativity, Virtues, Moral modalities, Consequentialism

Abstract

Elizabeth Anscombe’s critique on consequentialism in her “Modern Moral Philosophy” marked a milestone in the development of Anglo-American moral philosophy and virtue ethics. First of all, I briefly indicate the historical context of her criticism, as well as the proper meaning of her rejection of “moral ought”. Second, I will consider the relation between obligation and virtues, through the notion of moral modalities and human needs. Last, I will formulate some suggestions on the relation between moral normativity and human goods.

Published

30-09-2010

How to Cite

Torralba, José María. “Human Goods and Moral Normativity. G.E.M. Anscombe’s Critique of the Concept of ‘Moral ought’”. Acta Philosophica 19, no. 2 (September 30, 2010): 349–362. Accessed July 14, 2024. https://www.actaphilosophica.it/article/view/3922.

Issue

Section

Notes