The I-World Relationship in Husserl's Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind


  • Loreta Risio Università degli Studi di Chieti


Husserl, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Mind, Phenomenal Consciousness, Intentionality, Enactivism, Mind-Body Relation, Living Body (Leib)


The paper focuses on classical issues of philosophy of mind from a phenomenological point of view. The questions at stake concern the relation between mind and world, subject and object of knowledge, mental and physical dimension of subjectivity. An integrate approach seems to be the best way to deal with such problems : on one hand Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology offers an effective interpretation of the consciousness, on the other hand philosophy of mind dialogues to computational sciences. The first section of the work discusses the status of phenomenal aspect of consciousness : whether it is just an epiphenomenon of intentional consciousness, or it has a fundamental cognitive function, like Husserl argues. The second section analyzes cognitive theories of internalism compared to the Husserlian phenomenological idea of knowledge ; finally the third section presents similarities between externalism and transcendental idealism, between enactivist- and phenomenological concept of body (Leib), in the attempt to overcome the Cartesian dualism.



How to Cite

Risio, Loreta. “The I-World Relationship in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind”. Acta Philosophica 24, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 87–110. Accessed July 23, 2024.




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