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## SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN TRUTH

OPPOSED errors in philosophy are subjectivism and objectivism. Both push subjectivity and objectivity, respectively, too far. The resulting irony is that subjectivism excludes not just objectivity but subjectivity too, whereas objectivism excludes not just subjectivity but objectivity as well. By analogy, egotism blocks not just altruism but true self-interest as well.

Subjectivism and objectivism break out in different ways. In ethics subjectivism defines value in terms of desire, right in terms of approval. In logic it equates truth-bearers with psychological acts. In metaphysics it reduces being to being known. Behind all three lurks a half-truth which elicits the error. Value and rightness do always bear some relation to desire and approval. Truth-bearers, though not psychological acts, nonetheless depend on the psychological. And being, though not mind-dependent, is nevertheless always intelligible or geared to mind. For its part, objectivism manifests itself by divorcing good from purpose in ethics, admitting objective falsehoods in logic, or positing separated universals in metaphysics. Here as elsewhere it shuns subjectivism by overkill. And here again a half-truth lies behind it. Good is not whatever suits our purposes, but from that it hardly follows that good has nothing to do with purpose. Some statements are objectively false, but from that it does not follow that objective falsehoods are the objects of false beliefs. We know through universal concepts and we say that this intellectual knowledge is objective and public whereas our sensations are subjective and private. But from this one wrongly infers that the objects of universal concepts are themselves universal.

### 1. THE DIMENSIONS OF TRUTH

In truth as in other things objectivity and subjectivity must be saved. The one must not be so inflated as to exclude both itself and the other. Otherwise we countenance either objectivism or subjectivism. The former occurs when, eager to skirt the Protagorean dictum that man is the measure of all things, champions of objectivity embrace the opposite extreme, defining truth as the conformity of mind to thing instead of *vice versa*. That spikes subjectivism only to reap the opposed error of objectivism. And objectivism ruins both subjectivity and objectivity in truth. If truth is always the conformity of mind

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to thing, then things are never straightforwardly called true because they conform to mind. The outer is never true because it conforms to the inner. Yet we call artifacts, actions, words, gestures, and expressions true precisely in that sense. Sculptors sometimes match their ideal models in stone, generals sometimes carry out prearranged battle-plans on the field, the words of honest persons echo their beliefs, and so on. So objectivism or defining truth as the conformity of mind to thing excludes subjective truth, i.e. truth that consists in the conformity of thing to mind. But the irony is that it also rules out objectivity in truth. Objectivity demands broadness of vision. Yet the definition of truth as the conformity of mind to thing is too narrow to catch subjective truth. So the irony is that objectivism in truth undermines objectivity in truth.

By the same token, subjectivism too undermines both subjectivity and objectivity. If man is the measure of all things, then truth is never the conformity of mind to thing but always the conformity of thing to mind. The inner is never true because it conforms to the outer. But since objectivity insists that truth is realized both in the conformity of mind to thing and in the conformity of thing to mind, subjectivism rules out objectivity.

But the irony again is that subjectivism destroys subjectivity too. Subjectivity affirms that it is objectively true that some things are true because they conform to mind. In so doing it admits the truth of propositions along with the truth of things. Yet with doubtful consistency subjectivism in truth purports to say that no judgment is objectively true. Thus, in the matter of truth subjectivism bars subjectivity no less than it flouts objectivity.

Unlike subjectivism and objectivism, then, objectivity and subjectivity are not opposed to each other. They complement each other. They embrace the same definition. Under subjectivity and objectivity both, truth is defined as the conformity of mind *and* thing. This is broad enough to cover both the truth of propositions (the conformity of mind to thing) and the truth of things (the conformity of thing to mind). By contrast, the opposed definitions of truth espoused by subjectivism and objectivism are too narrow to catch the truth of propositions and the truth of things, respectively. In defining truth as the conformity of thing to mind, subjectivism leaves no room for propositional or objective truth. And in defining truth as the conformity of mind to thing, objectivism leaves no room for the truth of things or subjective truth.

If, to accommodate both objective and subjective truth, objectivity and subjectivity each define truth as the conformity of mind and thing, what is the difference between them? Are they just different names for the same thing? To this the answer is that they illumine different sides of the same thing. Without denying that truth is sometimes the conformity of thing to mind, defenders of objectivity advert to and emphasize the objective side of truth or the conformity of mind to thing. By the same token, without denying that truth is sometimes the conformity of mind to thing, defenders of subjectivity advert

to and stress the subjective side of truth or the conformity of thing to mind. Each side thus exercises scholastic abstraction. That consists in taking in one side of a complex and leaving out the other. But to leave something out of consideration is not to deny it. To focus on the duties of employers to their employees is not to deny the duties of employees to their employers. In terms of both what they take in and what they leave out, therefore, subjectivity and objectivity in truth are not just different but opposite perspectives. But in terms both of what they affirm and deny about truth as a whole they are the same. They are perspectivally and not propositionally opposed. Each one denies that truth is defined either as the conformity of thing to mind (subjectivism) or as the conformity of mind to thing (objectivism). But each one affirms that truth is defined as the conformity of mind *and* thing.<sup>1</sup>

With objectivity and subjectivity as thus defined, defenders of objectivism both agree and disagree. Applauding the rejection of subjectivism, they deny that man is the measure of all things. Yet they refuse to count subjective and objective truth as coordinate species of truth. Truth for them equals propositional truth or the conformity of mind or judgment to things. When DaVinci calls one painting the true *Monna Lisa* and another a false *Monna Lisa*, all he means is that about the former but not about the latter the true judgment, "That is the *Monna Lisa*" can be made. Thus, 'true' and 'false' are here used in an extended and not in a straightforward sense of those terms. Now since things are not to be multiplied unnecessarily and since one can assay all other cases of supposed subjective truth in the same way, it follows that no distinct subjective truth stands alongside of objective truth as two species of the same genus. Truth is nothing but the conformity of judgment to thing, in which case objectivism in truth is no one-sided error after all but the truth about truth.

This has the appeal of simplicity. Yet the question is whether it is not really simplistic. For it seems that not *every* instance of *prima facie* subjective truth is assimilable to a mere extended sense of objective truth. Thus, suppose that DaVinci paints a false *Monna Lisa* before making the true one, which so far exists only in his mind. When friends see it and he advises them that it is a false start or a mistake, everyone understands what he means. It is evident to them that he calls it false because it fails to conform to his ideal model. Besides being forced, saying that he calls it false because it might elicit the false judgment, "That is DaVinci's *Monna Lisa*" is in this case excluded. For neither DaVinci himself nor anyone else can make that judgment. DaVinci cannot be mistaken about his own ideal model. And it is a condition of anyone else making the judgment that they are acquainted with DaVinci's mental model, which they are not. One cannot ascribe to a subject something with which

<sup>1</sup> Unlike "to", "and" here allows the conformity to run in either direction, i.e. from mind to thing or from thing to mind.

one is unacquainted. DaVinci's friends can no more judge that what they see is or is not DaVinci's *Monna Lisa* than blind persons can judge that the apples they eat are or are not red. So, since in this case the false judgment "That is DaVinci's *Monna Lisa*" cannot even arise, no one can say that DaVinci calls his first try false because it might elicit that judgment. But then it is false to say that all *prima facie* instances of subjective truth are nothing but extended senses of objective truth. And then a distinct and irreducible subjective truth is admitted.

This subjective truth divides into productive truth, moral truth, and lawful truth. All three are a conformity of the outer to the inner. In all three the inner measures and is the truth of the outer. In productive truth or the truth of things, something in the world corresponds to its ideal model. Thus, an artifact is true when it conforms to its archetype in the mind of its maker. If there is a God in whom there are Ideas, this productive truth would include not just the conformity of artifacts to their human models but also the conformity of natural things to their respective divine Ideas. In moral truth one's statements conform to one's beliefs or one's outward expressions or gestures conform to one's inner intentions or feelings. Thus, one makes a false promise when what one says contradicts one's intentions. This is truth in the sense of truthfulness. It differs from ethical truth in that in each case its standard or measure depends on us. Finally, in lawful truth some action or event conforms to some conventional or non-conventional law. Thus, one makes a false turn when one inadvertently enters a one-way street in reverse direction. Such a move is called false because it flouts a civil law. Again, a traveler is said to make a *faux pas* or false move when he acts contrary to a country's code of etiquette. Further, some say that the truth is not in us to the extent that we break the Commandments. By this it is meant that our actions fail to conform to divine law. And so on.

## 2. TRUTH AS MIND-DEPENDENT

Objectivists of different stripes will object that the foregoing view wrongly construes truth as being mind-dependent. Placing truth in minds seems to invite subjectivism or the view that whatever seems to some mind to be true is true. And then contradictories can be true at the same time since they seem to be true as seen by different minds at the same time.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, fixing truth in minds seems to imply that the bearers of objective truth are acts of thinking instead of what is thought in and through those acts.

These concerns are not groundless. No one countenances either subjectivism or psychologism. But the fact of the matter is that idealism on the ontological status of truth implies neither one. To say that judgments or the

<sup>2</sup> See AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 16, a. 1.

bearers of objective truth depend on minds for their existence does not imply that they depend on minds for their truth. Thus one compatibly affirms both objectivity and the idea that truth-bearers are mind-dependent. Moreover, to say that judgments are both truth-bearers and mind-dependent does not imply psychologism. That overlooks the possibility that what in the objective sense are true or false are not acts of judging themselves but those acts together with their objects. And from those objects the acts are never really separated. Thus, what fosters the inference in question is the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The inference feeds on first falsely abstracting acts of judging from their objects and then identifying truth-bearers with that abstracted part instead of with the concrete whole from which it was taken. And from this error it naturally follows that the mind-dependent status of truth implies psychologism.

So much for defense. As for offense, that truth is in minds and not in things is shown by the fact of falsehood. Falsehood is not a thing but signifies the lack of something. False judgments are those to which no fact corresponds. When it is not raining and I judge that it is, what I judge to be the case is absent or missing in reality. Since, then, falsehood is not real being and yet is a property of judgments, it must be in the sense of being in mind as a being of reason. This accords with our commonsense belief that it is what we think or judge to be real that is false and not the real itself. And since the same assay is given of truth as is given of falsehood, it follows that truth too is in minds and not in things.

Fearing psychologism, some deny this and posit objective falsehoods as the objects of false beliefs. This at first sight threatens the difference between true and false beliefs. If something real corresponds to mind in false as well as in true belief, it then becomes difficult to see, as Russell says, how the difference between true and false beliefs is preserved.<sup>3</sup> But to answer this, defenders of objective falsehoods distinguish two kinds of real or mind-independent objects. There are *existent* things such as the events or facts to which our true judgments correspond and there are *subsistent* things such as objective truths and falsehoods. The difference, then, between our true and false judgments is this. Each one of our true judgments has an objective sense which is a subsistent true proposition and in addition refers to some corresponding existent fact or event. By contrast, each one of our false judgments has an objective sense which is a subsistent false proposition but does not in addition refer to some corresponding existent fact or event. Thus, the difference between our true and false beliefs or judgments is preserved without assigning truth and falsity to minds. This is commonly known as the proposition theory.

Nevertheless, it is better not to multiply entities beyond necessity. Therefore, if by assigning truth to minds one can explain the truth-relation without

<sup>3</sup> B. RUSSELL, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London 1912, p. 124.

falling victim to psychologism, then why admit in addition to existent minds and things a separate realm of subsistent truths and falsehoods?

Besides, it seems that the proposition theory implies skepticism. Let it be granted that knowledge entails truth. This may be expressed as,

K If a person S knows that something is the case then it is the case or is true.

If propositions are the bearers of "true" then "...is true" in K is predicated of a proposition. But then K makes sense only if in K the object of S's knowledge is also a proposition. For grammatically the pronoun 'it' of which 'true' is predicated refers back to what is known. Therefore, if propositions are the bearers of "true" and if K is assumed, then it follows that propositions are the objects of knowledge in the sense of knowledge-that. But then, whenever it is known that something or other is the case what is known is always a proposition and not a fact. So if K is true, identifying the bearer of "true" with propositions implies that facts are unknown. Thus,

1. If a person S knows that grass is green then it is true that grass is green.
2. But no fact is true.
3. So if S knows that grass is green, then in knowing this, S does not know a fact.
4. But if S's knowing that grass is green is not a case of knowing a fact then nothing is and facts are unknown.

To answer this objection, a proposition-theorist might identify a true proposition with a fact. True propositions conform to facts in that they *are* facts; they do not conform to facts in that they are similar to facts. To say a proposition is true is not to say that some other thing, a fact, answers to it but that it, the proposition, is a fact. That being the case, for any person S to know that P is true is *ipso facto* for S to know a fact, in which case the objection of skepticism is answered.

Nevertheless, this identification of true propositions and facts implies that a belief has a different object depending on whether it is true or false. Since when I truly believe something what I believe is a true proposition, it follows, if true propositions are facts, that what I believe when I truly believe something is a fact. But since facts are not what are *falsely* believed, it follows that what I believe or the object of my belief is something different depending on whether my belief is true or false. And that is counterintuitive.

Second, identifying true propositions and facts implies a category mistake. When two or more species fall under a common genus they must have the same mode of being. Thus, it can be said that sheep and wolves fall under the genus *animal* but it is crossing categories to say that sheep and unicorns fall under the genus *animal*. In the first case both species have real being while in the second case there is an illogical mix. One species has real being and the other does not. And it is evident that this clash of categories comes from equivocating on the genus *animal*. In the second case but not in the first "ani-



mal” means two different things at once, namely, real animal and fictional animal. So it is no surprise that the species in the second division end up being incoordinate.

When a true proposition is just another name for a fact the same error occurs. Here, the two species that fall under the genus *proposition* are facts and false propositions. But since facts and false propositions (objective falsehoods) have very different modes of being, this division too is crossed. It is evidently not the same sense of “are” that one means when one says that facts are and that objective falsehoods are. Otherwise either falsehoods are just as real as facts or else, so far as ontological status goes, facts lose their advantage over falsehoods. But as before, this conflict in status among the species implies ambiguity in the genus. The incoordinate mix of species is due to equivocation on the genus *proposition* just as in the previous case it was due to equivocation on the genus *animal*. When facts are placed under the genus *proposition* then the latter must refer to real being. No species that has real being such as a fact includes a genus that has only objective being. Otherwise, since species includes genus, the contradiction ensues that the species in question has both real and objective being. But when objective falsehoods are placed under the genus *proposition* then the latter must have objective being only and not real being. And that for the same reason. To avoid contradiction, species like objective falsehoods that have objective being only do not include a genus that has real being.

It seems, then, that the proposition theory is untenable whether the correspondence relation is construed as similarity or as identity. And it is plausibly construed in no other way. The similarity account implies skepticism as regards facts. The identity account avoids this at the cost of implying both a category mistake and the ogre that what a person believes varies with the truth-value of the belief. Proposition-theorists, therefore, are caught between surrendering the correspondence theory and abandoning the proposition-theory altogether.

On the positive side, that truth depends on minds is gleaned from the intentionality of the truth-predicate. Though he identifies truth-bearers with sentences and not with judgments in our sense, W.V. Quine calls attention to this fundamental intentionality of the truth-predicate. The expression ‘is true’ he says, has the express purpose of reconciling our technical need for sentences with our interest in the objective world.<sup>4</sup> Identifying truth-bearers with mind-independent entities like objective propositions, then, comes from not appreciating that fact.<sup>5</sup> Though interested in the world and not in language (or thought) we nonetheless need to frame sentences or judgments.<sup>6</sup> This tends to block or divert our interest. We therefore need the truth predicate

<sup>3</sup> W. V. O. QUINE, *Philosophy of Logic*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1970, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> W. V. O. QUINE, o. c., p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> W. V. O. QUINE, o. c., p. 14.

to overcome and bridge this obstacle of sentences or judgments. This it does by referring them beyond themselves to the world. In that way is the truth predicate a bridge or fundamentally intentional. Says Quine,

«Truth hinges on reality; but to object, on this score, to calling sentences true, is a confusion. Where the truth predicate has its utility is in just those places where, though still concerned with reality, we are compelled by certain technical considerations to mention sentences. Here, the truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point».<sup>7</sup>

Thus, our interest in calling something *x* true in the objective sense is to get us beyond *x* to something else *y*, where *y* is reality or the mind-independent. That implies that *x* or the truth-bearer is not itself reality but mind or at least mind-dependent. Otherwise, truth-bearers being themselves real, it is nonsense to say that the truth-predicate carries us beyond truth-bearers to the real. The Brooklyn Bridge does not carry us beyond Brooklyn to Manhattan if it is already in Manhattan when we enter it. It follows that being inherently intentional and having the property of carrying us beyond truth-bearers to reality, the truth-predicate belongs to mind-dependent entities like sentences or judgments and not to real or mind-independent propositions. And that means that truth is in minds and not in things.

### 3. THE HIGHEST TRUTH

If truth is in minds and is irreducible to objective truth, then it follows that truth divides coordinately into objective and subjective truth. There is the truth of judgment and the truth of Ideas or models. Both are in minds and not in things, and both are truth in the proper sense. The difference is that in the truth of judgment truth is in mind as conformed to things while in the truth of Ideas truth is in mind as conformable to by things. That is just another way of saying that objective truth is truth that is measured by things while subjective truth is truth that is in some way the measure of things. Following St. Augustine's dictum that what measures is to that extent prior to what is measured,<sup>8</sup> one then distinguishes primary from secondary truth. The former is truth that is pattern or measure only, while the latter is truth that is in some way patterned after some measure.

Coupled, therefore, with the idea that what measures is prior to what is measured, the irreducibility of subjective to objective truth implies that the former is prior to the latter. In this sense is it true to say that overall there are degrees of truth. The truth of Ideas or models is higher than the truth of

<sup>7</sup> W. V. O. QUINE, *o. c.*, p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> St. AUGUSTINE, *On Free Will*, in Hyman and Walsh, editors, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Indianapolis 1973, p. 37.



judgment. For the former in some way measures while the latter in no way measures but is always something measured. Artists' models measure the artifacts that are modeled after them, but our judgments are not the measure of anything at all. On the contrary, they are entirely measured by facts. Though our judgments depend on mind for their being, they totally depend on facts for their truth. And it is due to this latter dependency, says Aquinas, that our intellect in its theoretical use ranks last in the matter of truth. Here there are no degrees of truth. The truth of any judgment is neither higher nor lower than the truth of any other judgment.

The difference between measured and unmeasured truth follows the difference between measured and unmeasured being. A thing has truth the same way it has being.<sup>9</sup> But on its objective or theoretical side the being of the intellect is entirely passive. It is an open place with respect to what fills it. It is thoroughly specified and actualized by its object. That the theoretical intellect is passive and so relatively low in the order of being is shown by the fact that its very form in knowing something is the form of the thing known. Lacking its own form or identity, it takes on the form or identity of what it knows. That is why Aristotle refers to intellect as a clean slate on which nothing is written.<sup>10</sup> Now following its being, its truth is also passive and measured by another. As was said, the truth of its judgments is totally caused by facts.

Yet on its subjective or practical side, the being of the intellect is in a sense active and unmeasured. That is because in its practical use the end and function of intellect is acting, making, and doing as opposed to simply knowing. As a result, intellect here has its own forms and so its own identity. Its form and identity is not, as in its theoretical use, simply the form and identity of another. Instead of being a blank, passive tablet, intellect is now act with respect to some passivity which it actuates. Instead of being determined by things intellect here determines things. And as it is with its being so is it with its truth. Through ideal forms in their intellects, artists and craftspersons make the things that are fashioned after them, imposing those forms on matter. And just to that extent is the truth of ideal models, unlike the truth of judgment, active and unmeasured.

Nevertheless, while in us subjective truth is higher than objective truth in the way just indicated, it is not the highest possible truth. That is because, though it measures, our subjective or practical truth is also measured. It stands, therefore, between the highest truth which is measure only and the lowest or objective truth which is always measured. Our subjective truth is measured because our plans and models are not created by us out of whole cloth but are instead derived by us from experience. Even though it was a novel plan, therefore, Jefferson's idea of *Monticello* was not *a priori* but *a pos-*

<sup>9</sup> See ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, II, 1 (993b 30-1).

<sup>10</sup> ARISTOTLE, *De anima*, III, 4 (430a 1).

*teriori*. But since what is a *posteriori* is measured and caused by the objects of experience, it follows that all ideal plans and models, in which our subjective truth consists, are measured or secondary truth.

To say that our subjective truth is in the sense specified higher than objective truth implies a highest truth. To say that something is either more or less true than another makes sense only if there is a highest truth to which the two are compared as to a standard. This highest truth, moreover, cannot be a standard that is made by us. It cannot be a subjective but must be an objective standard. Otherwise it is not true to say that subjective truth is in the way indicated objectively higher than objective truth. But it has been shown that the former is objectively speaking higher than the latter. Our subjective truth is higher than objective truth in the sense specified not because we say it is but we say it is higher because it is higher. If what measures is prior to what is measured, it is just a fact that the truth of ideal models is objectively speaking higher than the truth of judgment. But that implies that the highest truth, by virtue of which we make that objective comparison, is itself objective.

The stock objection to this is that from the fact that our subjective truth is higher than objective truth it does not follow that there is a highest truth. From the fact that nine is larger than five no one concludes that besides these there is a largest number. That *a* is objectively longer, wider, or heavier than *b* does not imply that there is something *c* that is the largest, widest, or heaviest. Accidents like length, width, or weight are quantifiable, and quantification is open-ended.

Yet, this objection feeds on the fallacy of the half-truth. True, among predicates that either fall in the category of quantity or are susceptible of quantification or measurement, differences in degree scarcely implies a highest degree. And yet, there are predicates which, because they range throughout the categories, do not belong to any one of the categories. Among these trans-categorical predicates, which scholastics called the transcendental predicates, are the predicates of 'true' and 'good'. And when it comes to these transcendental predicates of 'true' and 'good,' differences in degree *do* imply a highest degree. The reason for this is as follows. Limitlessness of degree implies quantity. What has no limit such as number, weight, or size is evidently either quantity or quantifiable. However, being taken just as being does not imply quantity. For being is primarily substance as opposed to accident or attribute, and while the concept of accident includes substance, the concept of substance does not include accident. But since quantity is an accident, then being as being does not imply quantity. But by contrast, being as being *does* imply the transcendental properties of true and good.

As for good, recall that form or the actual by definition realizes or fulfills the potential. Take Descartes piece of wax which is brought toward the fire.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> R. DESCARTES, *Meditations*, 2.

Considered not just as wax but as wax having the potential to become warm, the wax in question is something incomplete and unfulfilled. By analogy, just as the expression 2 is completed only when an actual number is assigned to n, so too the wax *qua* potentially warm is fulfilled only by receiving the form of heat. But to say this is to say that the wax *qua* potentially warm is perfected by the form of heat. If, metaphysically speaking, the actual is better than the potential, then the wax *qua* merely potentially hot is perfected by receiving the form of heat or by becoming actually hot. This does not imply and no one believes that hot wax is straight off better than cold wax. To think this is to miss the point. It is not wax considered *as wax* that is fulfilled or perfected by the form of heat; it is wax considered *as being only potentially hot* that is so perfected. Taken in this way, the wax has a hole or gap in it, just as the function 2 has a hole or gap in it. And in the case of the wax, the hole or gap is filled only by its actually becoming warm. Since, then, any being is being by virtue of actuality,<sup>12</sup> and since what is only potentially F is, taken as such, perfected by becoming actually F, it follows that any being as being is good – good to the extent that it fulfills or perfects.<sup>13</sup> And as for truth, it is of the nature of form or the actual to be intelligible, i.e. to be capable of conforming to, or of being conformed to by, some intellect. And that is what is meant by truth.<sup>14</sup> Something is intelligible only insofar as it is actual.<sup>15</sup> That is why potentiality as such is unknowable. Therefore, since once again any being is being by virtue of its act or form, which is the principle of intelligibility, it follows that any being as being is true.

That being the case, let us return to the point. If being does not imply quantity but for the reason just given being does imply truth, then it follows that truth does not imply quantity. But if that is so, then, since we saw that limitlessness of degree does imply quantity, then it follows further that truth is not limitless in degree. Therefore, that there are degrees of truth in the sense indicated implies that there is a highest truth, i.e. something that is ideal model only and in no sense something modeled after another, be it mind or matter. But since truth follows being in the order of logic, then one infers the level of being from the level of truth in the order of knowledge. Therefore, since something is being to the extent that it is actual or form, it follows that this highest truth is also highest being, i.e. being that is identified with its very own act or form.

So it is that the arm of truth has a long reach. To be sure, it extends to judgment, that peculiar mental act of «composing and dividing»,<sup>16</sup> as Aquin-

<sup>12</sup> See AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 5, a. 1 reply to obj. 1.

<sup>13</sup> AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 5, a. 3; Q. 5, a. 5.

<sup>14</sup> AQUINAS, *De veritate*, I, 2-4.

<sup>15</sup> ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, VIII, 9 (1051a 31); see also AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 5, a. 2.

<sup>16</sup> AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q. 16, a. 2.

nas called it, or of both «bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together...without uniting them into one...»,<sup>17</sup> as Locke characterized it. Yet beyond this propositional dimension, truth reaches out straightforwardly and not just in a derived sense to subjective or practical truth, to the truth of our plans and models in acting, making and doing. Here the pragmatists are right in denying that the truth of practice is parasitic on the truth of theory, i.e. that it is truth only in an extended sense. It is just that they replace one-sidedness in favor of theory with one-sidedness in favor of practice, reducing all truth to subjective or practical truth.<sup>18</sup> Finally, we saw that in its highest degree truth is in no way measured but is measure only. This is the truth of Ideas. Here in its primary sense truth is not the measured models of our minds but the unmeasured models of Mind. Even so, to the extent that it is a pattern or model of making, it can be said that truth is in this, its primary sense, a subjective and not an objective truth, i.e. a truth of practice and not the truth of theory.

#### 4. SUMMARY: AN INVENTORY OF TRUTH

To sum up what has been said, we can now take a final inventory of truth. Truth divides not just into (A) objective and subjective truth but also into (B) proper and improper truth, and (C) primary and secondary truth. This yields the following logical possibilities, not all of which are real possibilities: (1) objective, proper, primary truth, (2) objective, proper, secondary truth, (3) objective, improper, primary truth, (4) objective, improper, secondary truth, (5) subjective, proper, primary truth, (6) subjective, proper, secondary truth, (7) subjective, improper, primary truth, and (8) subjective, improper, secondary truth. We have seen that the principle of division in (A) is whether the truth-relation is the conformity of mind to thing or of thing to mind. The basis of division in (B) is whether truth is predicated of the ideal or the real. Finally, the principle of division in (C) is whether the truth is measure only or whether it is in some way measured by something, as, for example, our true judgments are measured by facts.

From this it follows that (1) and (3) are empty sets. If objective truth is the truth of judgment and judgments are measured by things, then objective truth is necessarily secondary and not primary truth. To say that "Snow is white" is true is to say that it conforms to the fact which is its ground and measure. (2) is not an empty set but includes all and only true judgments. (4) includes natural and artificial things considered as being the ground of our true judgments about them. Snow is objectively and improperly called true because it is the ground of a true judgment about it, say, "Snow is white". And an artifact

<sup>17</sup> J. LOCKE, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Oxford University Press, London 1960, p. 93.

<sup>18</sup> See W. JAMES, *What Pragmatism Means*, in W. JAMES, *Essays in Pragmatism*, edited by A. Castell, New York 1964, p. 142; 147-8.

like *Monticello* is objectively and improperly called true for the same reason. (5) includes all and only divine Ideas. Unlike human ideal models and plans, God's Ideas are the measures of objects without in any sense being measured. That is why they are truth in the primary sense. Ideal models like Jefferson's idea of *Monticello* measure the artifacts that are modeled after them. But they are also for their part measured. It is because Jefferson saw actual buildings that he created *Monticello*. Besides Jefferson's model of *Monticello*, (6) includes all and only human ideal models and plans. (7), like (1) and (3), is an empty set. What are subjectively and improperly speaking true are artifacts and actions that are modeled after their ideal models and plans, respectively. Thus, *Monticello* is subjectively and improperly called true because it conforms to and is hence measured by Jefferson's ideal model. And construction activities at a building site are subjectively and improperly called true because they conform to and are measured by the architect's blueprint. But since nothing that is primarily speaking true is measured by another, it is impossible for anything that is subjectively and improperly speaking true to be primarily speaking true. For to repeat, what are subjectively and improperly true, e.g. artifacts and actions, are measured by the models and plans of makers and doers. Finally, (8) includes all and only artifacts and actions that are modeled after and measured by their respective ideal models and plans. These are secondarily true because they are measured by their corresponding models and plans. They are subjectively speaking true because they bear upon making and doing, respectively. And they are improperly speaking true because they are real and not ideal. Thus we end up with the following definitions:

D<sub>1</sub> x is properly speaking true =df x is some thought or idea which either conforms to or is conformed to by some real thing.

D<sub>2</sub> x is improperly speaking true =df x is some real thing which either conforms to or is conformed to by some thought or idea.

D<sub>3</sub> x is primarily speaking true =df i) x is properly speaking true, ii) x is conformed to as measure by things and iii) x does not depend on anything as its measure or cause.

D<sub>4</sub> x is secondarily speaking true =df i) x is either properly or improperly speaking true and ii) x is measured by some thing or mind.

D<sub>5</sub> x is objectively and properly speaking true =df (i) x is secondarily speaking true, (ii) x is an idea that conforms to something as its measure.

D<sub>6</sub> x is subjectively and properly speaking true =df (i) x is either primarily or secondarily speaking true and (ii) x is some idea to which some real thing conforms as to a measure.

D<sub>7</sub> x is objectively but improperly speaking true df= (i) x is some real thing

that is secondarily speaking true and (ii)  $x$  is the ground or measure of some idea or thought.

D8  $x$  is subjectively but improperly speaking true df= (i)  $x$  is some real thing that is secondarily speaking true and (ii)  $x$  is grounded in and measured by some ideal model.