ALASDAIR MACINTYRE (III), 2011-2018

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Extending the thematic bibliography previously covering the years 1984-2001[1] and 2002-2010,[2] this essay includes prominent secondary literature focused on Alasdair MacIntyre's work, published between 2011 and 2018. Since MacIntyre has also just published an important book and a number of articles, it will first include an overview of his recent work.

Because of the sheer volume of publications drawing upon aspects of MacIntyre's work published since 2011,[3] this bibliography must inevitably be selective. Focusing on research published in English, two others selection criteria have been adopted: First, I aim to illustrate the breadth of MacIntyre's influence beyond moral philosophy. In fields as various as strategic management, anthropology, and nursing, researchers have found inspiration and drawn insights from MacIntyre's work. This is in part a reflection of MacIntyre's efforts to develop an approach to moral theory that does not disregard the practitioner's perspective.

Second, I focus on the way that tensions within MacIntyre's work have influenced his commentators. In this light, it is not implausible to suggest that we are witnessing a spectrum of left and right MacIntyreans, each of whom can legitimately claim to be developing aspects of MacIntyre's work. This focus serves to indicate the vast range of questions that still remain to be answered, questions often given a much greater salience as a result of MacIntyre's work. Thus, while this thematic bibliography is necessarily selective, its scope is broad.

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[1] M. D'Avenia, *Bibliografia tematica: opere recenti sulla filosofia morale di Alasdair MacIntyre*, «Acta Philosophica», 11/1 (2002), pp. 159-168.

[2] M. D'Avenia, *Bibliografia tematica: Alasdair MacIntyre (II)*, «Acta Philosophica», 19/1 (2010), pp. 195-210.

[3] A Google Scholar search of the years spanning 2011-2018 returns over 16,000 results. Also, in some cases, I have included work published in 2010 not included in previous bibliographies.

1. MacIntyre's Recent Work

There is no doubt that *After Virtue*[4] (henceforth, av) will remain MacIntyre's most important work, both because of its compelling argument and because of the large impact that it has had in numerous areas of practical philosophy and applied ethics, but his latest work, *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative*[5] (henceforth, ECM) offers something like a *summa* of MacIntyre's most important claims. MacIntyre begins by focusing on the debate between neo-Aristotelian and expressivist accounts of the notion of "good" but his concern is not to offer a further contribution to this debate.

Whereas expressivists have been developing increasingly sophisticated responses to the challenge of realist positions in meta-ethics,[6] MacIntyre argues that this issue can only be settled by turning to practice. Thus, from Chapter 1's focus on meta-ethics, MacIntyre moves, in Chapter 2, to consider the social contexts faced by Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, and Marx, before examining the contemporary context, focusing on the state and the market, in Chapter 3. Thus Chapters 2 and 3 offer a restatement of claims made in various places, most prominently in AV concerning the rise of modernity as a gradual loss of a coherent moral framework and its replacement by an incoherent set of moral notions. MacIntyre expands this narrative since ECM now includes a Marxian account of "Morality", capitalized, as an incoherent set of modern moral notions including concepts of rights and utility, which serves to promote the smooth functioning of the capitalist economy. At this point MacIntyre's account is close to Althusser's[7] notion of ideology. Thus, while offering a restatement of his earlier views, ECM addresses a range of additional topics including the question of surplus value in Marx, economic theory, distributism, and an account of the function of Morality in modern capitalist societies.

Chapter 4 is arguably the most compelling of the book and the most relevant to the initial questions raised in Chapter 1 concerning the debate between expressivism and neo-Aristotelianism. In this chapter, MacIntyre develops examples of grassroots political action – one of the Monte Azul *favela* in Brazil and one of fishing communities reacting to globalization in Denmark – that illustrate the relationship between virtues, negative precepts of the natural

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[4] A. C. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (3rd ed.), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (in) 2007.

[5] Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016, p. 322.

[6] M. Schroeder, *What is the Frege-Geach problem?*, «Philosophical Compass», 3/4 (2008), pp. 703-720.

[7] L. Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, Verso Books, New York 2014.

law, common goods, and political action. These examples are complemented by a discussion of the achievement of common goods within organizations.

In the same chapter, MacIntyre discusses Tom Burns, whose research on the BBC was a partial inspiration for MacIntyre's appreciation of the distinction between practices and institutions, and praises «the maverick American management theorist» W. Edwards Deming, for developing team-based modes of production centered upon common goods, which enabled workers to move beyond a subjection to «mindless routines on production lines» (p. 130). What makes this chapter so interesting is the way that MacIntyre illustrates the political resources provided a by a broadly Thomist understanding of the virtues and the precepts of the natural law, the way that Thomism easily conceptualizes a common form of grassroots politics. What makes it so compelling is the way that MacIntyre illustrates a range of common goods in families, workplaces, local communities, and beyond that can neither be dismissed – because of their fundamental importance – nor be achieved without a commitment to the virtues. Chapter 5 contains four narratives that further illustrate the applicability of central Thomist concepts to actual practical decisions. Of particular interest are the narratives of C.L.R. James and Fr. Denis Faul, each of which clearly illustrate aspects of MacIntyre's own Marxist inflected Thomist perspective.

ECM represents a definitive statement of MacIntyre's distinctive approach to neo-Aristotelian and Thomist practical philosophy but a number of his other recent papers provide additional details of this account. For a brief statement of the primary concerns driving ECM, readers would do well to turn to MacIntyre's autobiographical essay, *On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the Twentieth Century*.[8] This collection contains papers originally given at a conference at University College Dublin in 2009, honoring Alasdair MacIntyre's 80th birthday.

The collection includes papers by a number of influential scholars including John Haldane, Raymond Geuss, Hans Fink, Owen Flanagan, Stephen Mulhall, amongst others and is particularly helpful because it captures the great variety of ethical questions impacted by MacIntyre's work. MacIntyre's lead essay outlines his continuing interesting in the semantics of "good" and explains the importance of practice to his account of the virtues. MacIntyre (p. 22) says,

I am saying that it is only through recognition at the level of practice of our need for the virtues, and through practical experience of how the exercise of the virtues stands to the achievement of goods, that a number of Aristotle's philosophical arguments become compelling.

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[8] A. C. MacIntyre, *On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the Twentieth Century*, in F. O'Rourke (ed.), *What Happened to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (in) 2013, pp. 17-34.

One might compare this claim to the examples discussed in ECM. This perspective on practice separates MacIntyre from other neo-Aristotelian naturalists such as Michael Thompson, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse whose extensive discussions of the human form of life have typically avoided considerations of *actual* human lives. In addition to the lead essay of *What Happened to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, MacIntyre also provided a response to the contributors titled *Epilogue: What Next?* (pp. 474-486). MacIntyre's *On Not Knowing Where You Are Going*, published in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,[9] offers similar autobiographical reflections.

Another recently published article is important because it develops themes from *Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings need the Virtues*.[10] In this earlier book, MacIntyre had focused on the fundamental importance of vulnerability as a factor shaping the role of the virtues within human life. In *Danish Ethical Demands and French Common Goods: Two Moral Philosophies*,[11] MacIntyre offers a genealogical explanation of the development of phenomenological accounts of the *ethical demand* in post-WWII European philosophy, with a focus on Løgstrup and Levinas.

Calling these phenomenological accounts "normativity without norms," MacIntyre argues that they are

intelligible only as the end result of a history during which the relevant set of norms had lost whatever it had been that had once made those norms compelling (p. 14).

Following a pattern familiar from *After Virtue* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* MacIntyre argues that this type of phenomenological approach to ethics is intelligible as a remnant of a previous mode of life wherein ethical norms and practices were well-ordered and directed toward a shared conception of the common good. What is interesting is both MacIntyre's recognition of the importance of the phenomenological aspects of the ethical demand and the suggestion that if we understand moral «fragmentation a good deal better than as yet we do, we might also begin to understand how to reintegrate» these fragments (p. 15).

In one recent article, *Ends and Endings*,[12] MacIntyre discusses a consistent theme of his analysis of the moral fragmentation of modernity: the marginalization of the notion of a final end. MacIntyre argues that contrary to Harry Frankfurt's (2004) claim that an agent's final end is constituted by an «affective commitment that provides a terminus for our practical reasoning, but cannot

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[9] Vol. 84/2 (Nov. 2010), pp. 61-74.   [10] Open Court, Chicago 1999.
[11] «European Journal of Philosophy», 18/1 (2010), pp. 1-16.
[12] «American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly», 88/4 (2014), pp. 807-821.

itself be rationally justified» (p. 811), human beings «are able to engage in rational self-questioning» even about their most basis affective commitment (p. 820). Human agents can always ask whether their current purposes are actually good, or worth pursuing. This article could usefully be compared to Michael Thompson's University of Notre Dame Press recent neo-Aristotelian account of the concepts of life, agency and practices, as it aims to underwrite the fundamental role of the concept of the human life-form in practical reasoning.[13]

In *How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary: Ethics, Resistance, and Utopia*,[14] MacIntyre provides the social and political context needed to understand the human good. He argues that the virtues are primarily manifest in political conflicts where agents work in concert to achieve various common goods needed to live well. As noted previously, this focus on the social and political role of the virtues sets MacIntyre's apart from other neo-Aristotelians. This article, and some of the other articles collected in this volume were given at a conference in London in 2007. MacIntyre also provided a lengthy response to the other contributors titled, *Where We Were, Where We Are, Where We Need to Be*, (pp. 307-334), which offers insightful commentary. Other contributions to this collection are discussed below.

Another series of articles develops aspects of MacIntyre's theological perspective as this intersects with his philosophical concerns. Among these is *Writing as Social Disclosure: A Hundred Years Ago and Now*,[15] an article discussing the importance of G.K. Chesterton's philosophical journalism. MacIntyre argues that only a theistic perspective can enable us to understand how we ought to relate to others, specifically how we ought to respond to the facts about poverty and inequality, and that one of the great merits of Chesterton and his interlocutor George Bernard Shaw

was to find those genres in which, by focusing attention on this or that particular situation or problem, they could disclose to others truths about themselves and their social relationships of which their readers and audiences would otherwise be unaware (p. 114).

In *How to be a Theistic Philosopher in a Secularized Culture*,[16] MacIntyre sketches what he takes to be important about the theistic perspective, complement-

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[13] Cfr. M. THOMPSON, *Life and Action. Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2008.

[14] A. C. MACINTYRE, *How Aristotelianism Can Become Revolutionary: Ethics, Resistance, and Utopia*, in P. BLACKLEDGE and K. KNIGHT (eds.), *Virtue and Politics: Alasdair MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (IN) 2011, pp. 11-19.

[15] A. C. MACINTYRE, *Writing as Social Disclosure: A Hundred Years Ago and Now*, in A. FIVES and K. BREEN (eds.), *Philosophy and Political Engagement: Reflection in the Public Sphere*, Palgrave MacMillan, London 2013, pp. 99-115.

[16] «Proceedings of the ACPA», 84 (2011), pp. 23-32.

ing his discussion of the importance of Chesterton's Catholic perspective (of the previous article). MacIntyre argues that contemporary secularism has no place for moral absolutes, for absolute negative prohibitions, and, similarly, that it must refuse to ask fundamental questions about the limitations of scientific explanations. MacIntyre (p. 27) asserts that

atheism involves a diminished and restricted conception of explanation and understanding and the onus is upon the atheist to justify the restriction, to show that our astonishment at the transformation of particles into physicists is not as much an expression of a legitimate demand for explanation as is our astonishment at the transformation of seeds into apple trees.

MacIntyre's *The Very Idea of a University: Aristotle, Newman and Us*,[17] outlines the type of explanation that contemporary secularism fails to seek. According to MacIntyre, in an argument that resembles the argument offered by Bernard Lonergan, in the last pages of *Insight*, «belief in God cannot be a conjecture and is in relation to scientific enquiry, we might be tempted to say, an inescapable presupposition» (p. 15) for without theistic commitments we can make no sense of our capacity to know the world through scientific inquiry. These papers offer a crucial supplement to MacIntyre's brief discussion of theism in ECM.

Two other articles illustrate the complexity of MacIntyre's views. The first article, *Military Ethics: A Discipline in Crisis*[18] provides an assessment of the current state of military ethics. MacIntyre says,

If Islamic terrorism and ISIL and are at home in and generated from certain specific types of culture, as they are, then it matters very much that both during and after the armed conflict, a care for justice should extend to the other inhabitants of those cultures (p. 13).

What is striking is the fact that MacIntyre's assessment of military ethics, though critical, involves very little of the idealism of many other radical social theorists. There is no suggestion that military operations – unlike financial trading – are inherently unethical. Instead, MacIntyre seems to accept an important role for armed conflict in the contemporary context. His argument aims to highlight the importance of political prudence – including an adequate sense of the political context of the communities involved in a specific context – as a key virtue for military commanders.

Another article that has already been influential, titled *The Irrelevance of Ethics*[19] offers an extended critique of financial trading and the financial sector,

[17] «New Blackfriars», 91/1031 (2010), pp. 4-19.
[18] G. Lucas (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Military Ethics*, Routledge, New York 2015, pp. 3-14.
[19] A. Bielskis and K. Knight (eds.), *Virtue and Economy*, Ashgate, Burlington (vt) 2015, pp. 7-21.

more generally. This article was originally given as a lecture at Cambridge in 2009 shortly after the onset of the recent financial crisis. MacIntyre argues that business ethics is irrelevant to the financial sector because the qualities needed to be a good trader are incompatible with the qualities needed to be a good human being. MacIntyre also laments the separation between economics (broadly construed) and moral philosophy.

But MacIntyre's claims about the financial sector, while not without some plausibility, are apt to strike readers as a startling example of the separation of morals and money that he laments. MacIntyre (p. 16) says that

part of what our description has to capture is the double aspect of the globalizing economy and its financial sector, so that we understand it both as an engine of growth and as such a source of benefits, but equally as a perpetrator of great harms and continuing injustices.

But arguably, MacIntyre's account has failed to capture this "double aspect" and similarly failed to give a sympathetic account of moral sensibilities of persons in the financial sector. One might note books such as Nicholas Nassim Taleb's *The Black Swan*[20] and *The Clash of Culture: Investment vs. Speculation*, written by Vanguard founder John Bogle,[21] as examples of industry insiders who have recognized the limits of current industry practices and have sought to offer an alternative vision of the practice of finance.

Aside from MacIntyre's (p. 17) claim that «we have no alternative to the globalizing economy as it now is and that its propensities for good and for harm cannot be split apart» is his rejection of distributism as a viable economic alternative to capitalism. MacIntyre (p. 16) says that the Dominican Father Vincent McNabb «provided a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that we can simply withdraw from or reject that latter world,» the contemporary world shaped by the state and the market. MacIntyre had made a similar point in *Writing as Social Disclosure: A Hundred Years Ago and Now*[22] but this has not prevented attempts to associate MacIntyre's views with that of agrarians such as Wendell Berry. As will be apparent below, a number of philosophers and business ethicists have challenged MacIntyre's claims concerning the morality (or lack thereof) of the financial sector.

In a final short reflection article, *Charles Taylor and Dramatic Narrative: Argument and Genre*[23] MacIntyre offers praise and appreciation for Taylor's philosophical achievements. MacIntyre's (p. 762) says that after Taylor,

[20] Random House, New York 2007.
[21] John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken (NJ) 2012.
[22] A. Fives and K. Breen (eds.), *Philosophy and Political Engagement. Reflection in the Public Sphere*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2016, pp. 99-115.
[23] «Philosophy & Social Criticism», 44/77 (2018), pp. 761-763.

we now cannot avoid recognizing that much piecemeal work in philosophy, in history, and in the human sciences either contributes to or presupposes (or both) some background narrative of the same order as that presented by Taylor, something of which the practitioners of those disciplines have been too often unaware.

Like Taylor, MacIntyre has also greatly contributed to the recognition of the importance of background narratives to any particular inquiry.

2. Secondary Literature Developing MacIntyrean Themes

As noted in the introduction, it is not possible to discuss all of the books and articles that have drawn explicitly upon MacIntyre's work. Instead, I offer a survey that aims to illustrate the breadth of MacIntyre's influence and the tensions and conflicts that this influence has generated. At this point, Christopher Lutz's *Reading Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue*, should be noted.[24] Arguably, it provides the best introduction to MacIntyre's groundbreaking text.

2. 1. *Practices in the Economy*

Many readers might be surprised to find out that MacIntyre's work – despite his protests – has proven to be highly influential in business ethics. A number of papers have directly challenged MacIntyre's claims about the financial sector. In *Aristotle and MacIntyre on the Virtues and Finance* in A.J.G. Sison et al. (eds.),[25] Ferrero and Sison argue that finance can actually be characterized as a practice. Rocchi and Thunder, in an article titled *Can a Good Person be a Good Trader? An Ethical Defense of Financial Trading*[26] challenge MacIntyre's broadbrush characterization of finance as inherently unethical.

Before this, Wyma in *The Case for Investment Advising as a Virtue-Based Practice*,[27] argued that investment advising has all of the characteristics of a MacIntyrean practice. Another recent paper, by Roncella and Ferrero, *A MacIntyrean Perspective on the Collapse of a Money Market Fund*,[28] offers an insightful MacIntyrean analysis of the closure of the reserve primary fund (RPF), a key catalyst of the 2008 financial crisis.

It should be noted that the adoption of a MacIntyrean approach to financial ethics, is only the most recent iteration of MacIntyre's growing influence in the field of business ethics. Readers of *After Virtue* may be shocked to discover

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[24] Continuum, Vancouver 2012.
[25] *Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management*, International Handbooks in Business Ethics, Springer, Dordrecht 2017, pp. 1153-1161.
[26] «Journal of Business Ethics», 2017, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3756-3.
[27] «Journal of Business Ethics», 127/1 (2015), pp. 231-249.
[28] «Journal of Business Ethics», 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-4078-9.

this influence, but as Chapters 3 and 4 of ECM make apparent, MacIntyre has a keen interest in questions of organizational ethics and his distinctive, practice-inflected, approach to neo-Aristotelian virtue theory offers a unique way of identifying the role of the virtues within contemporary business practice, and of critiquing structural and managerial factors that disrupt their cultivation and exercise. Two of the most influential proponents of this approach are Ron Beadle and Geoff Moore. Beadle has largely focused on the circus as a practice-bearing institution, an example of a modern institution that has clung to an older tradition of the virtues. Two of his recent articles are *Managerial Work in a Practice-Embodying Institution: The Role of Calling, The Virtue of Constancy*,[29] and *Virtue and Meaningful Work*.[30]

Moore's recently published *Virtue at Work: Ethics for Individuals, Managers, and Organizations*,[31] offers, what might be taken to be, a definitive statement of the MacIntyrean approach to business ethics. Although, as will be noted shortly, this approach is highly contested by other attempts to employ MacIntyre's concept of a practice in an economic context. *Virtue at Work* is clearly written for a lay audience and would make an ideal teaching text, yet it draws continuously on empirical research as well as conceptual and philosophical analyses. In this, it could serve as something of a model for a MacIntyrean approach to scholarship, even if Moore is much less critical of contemporary economic practices than MacIntyre or many other MacIntyreans. But as noted, Moore supports this somewhat more positive approach with empirical evidence, much of it drawn from his own earlier, influential papers.

At the heart of Moore's approach is the claim that organizations – both for-profit corporations and non-profit institutions – can be analyzed as practice-institution combinations. While he acknowledges the potential for practices to become corrupted, he argues that "vestiges of a practice" (p. 145), fragmented normative considerations, typically remain in any organization, and can serve as the basis for moral agency, even in the most difficult situations. Moore's focus is often on organizations where practices and institutional aspects are relatively well ordered, but the question of the extent of well ordered practice-based institutions within the contemporary economy and possibilities for moral agency provided by vestiges of practices are questions that demand more extensive empirical research.

Many recent critical applications of MacIntyre's practice-institution schema are collected in *Virtue and Economy*,[32] for example Rajeev Sehgal's *Is Aristote-*

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[29] «Journal of Business Ethics», 113/4 (2013), pp. 679-690.
[30] With K. KNIGHT, «Business Ethics Quarterly», 22/2 (2012), pp. 433-450.
[31] Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017.
[32] A. BIELSKIS and K. KNIGHT (eds.), *Virtue and Economy: Essays on Morality and Markets*, Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames 2016.

lian Capitalism Possible? (pp. 55-72), and Niko Noponen's *The Great Perverting Transformation* (pp. 135-151). While these papers provide convincing evidence of the difficulty faced by any attempt to apply MacIntyre's concept of a practice to contemporary economic activity, Sehgal arguably relies too extensively on anecdotal evidence, discussing clear cases of corporate malfeasance without offering evidence of the larger implications of such malfeasance. Likewise Noponen's article draws heavily on Karl Polanyi's account of the rise of capitalism, an account that offers significant support for MacIntyre's critical views of the contemporary economy, but fails to discuss prominent criticisms of Polanyi's account.[33]

In *The Just World Fallacy as a Challenge to the Business-As-Community Thesis*, Matthew Sinnicks acknowledges the challenges facing Aristotelian approaches to business ethics and outlines several ways in which firms might become more virtuous.[34] Two related papers illustrate these difficulties. Angus Robson, in *Constancy and Integrity: (Un)measurable Virtues?*,[35] drawing upon first-hand interviews, argues that banking, while in the recent past possessing many of the characteristics of a practice, has more recently been to some extent corrupted by market pressures. In *Human Resource Management in a Compartmentalized World: Whither Moral Agency?*, Tracy Wilcox offers a similar study, drawing upon ethnographic research to explore the role of the virtues in the struggles and conflicts facing human resources managers in contemporary organizations.[36] These papers illustrate the challenges facing virtuous agents within the contemporary economy but their first-hand empirical evidence and appreciation of nuance suggests the MacIntyrean framework has much to offer researchers and virtuous practitioners, without downplaying the potential corrupting effect of economic structures.

Alejo Sison and Joan Fontrodona, in *The Common Good of the Firm in the Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition*,[37] draw upon MacIntyre's concept of practice to elaborate the notion of the common good of the firm. But they seek to differentiate themselves from MacIntyre by arguing that institutions should not be seen as inherently corrupting. What is perhaps most surprising are recent articles wherein management scholars draw upon MacIntyre's notion of practice for explanatory purposes. In *Carrots and Rainbows: Motivation and Social Practice in Open Source Software Development*, Georg von Krogh, Stefan Haefliger, Sebastian Spaeth, and Martin W. Wallin critique social scientific theories of

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[33] See for example M. GRANOVETTER's *Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of Embededness*, «American Journal of Sociology», 91 (1985), pp. 481-510.

[34] «Business & Society», 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650318759486.

[35] «Business Ethics: European Review», 24/S2 (2015), pp. S115-S129.

[36] «Journal of Business Ethics», 111/1 (2012), pp. 85-96.

[37] «Business Ethics Quarterly», 22/2 (2012), pp. 211-246.

motivation, arguing that they are inadequate to explain the motivations of developers of open source software.[38] Instead, they draw upon MacIntyre's notions of practice, institution, and narrative to explain this phenomenon, arguing that ethical motivations are essential to understanding why developers engage in this form of practice.

Hardimos Tsoukas in *Strategy and Virtue: Developing Strategy-as-Practice through Virtue Ethics*,[39] offers an extended defense of the relevance of the MacIntyrean notion of practice to explaining strategy formation within for-profit firms. Like Sison and Fontrodona, he argues that institutions have an important role in establishing and maintaining the cooperative social relationships characteristic of practices and ensuring that they promote the common good. Tsoukas has also recently published a collection of papers, *Philosophical Organization Theory*,[40] which illustrates the importance of the MacIntyrean notion of practice, including especially the concept of "standards of excellence," for understanding how organizations function.

Also noteworthy is Gregory Beabout's *Management as a Domain-Relative Practice that Requires and Develops Practical Wisdom*,[41] where he argues that management can be understood as a type of higher-order practice which ensures that lower-order practices are well-functioning. Beabout makes a more extended argument about the role of the virtues in managerial practice in *The Character of the Manager: From Office Executive to Wise Steward*.[42] In *Practices, Governance, and Politics: Applying MacIntyre's Ethics to Business*, Matthew Sinnicks argues that practice-based modes of work requires both virtuous managers and regulatory support, suggesting that MacIntyrean business ethics should take more of a political turn.[43] Likewise, in *Networks of Giving and Receiving in an Organizational Context: Dependent Rational Animals and MacIntyrean Business Ethics*, Caleb Bernacchio argues that vulnerability provides additional scope to the role of the virtues within organizations, suggesting that relationships of giving and receiving extend within and between organizations and beyond to other members of the community.[44]

In a related manner, Aaron Cobb, in *Acknowledged Dependence and the Virtues of Perinatal Hospice*,[45] argues that perinatal hospice, where care is extended to children diagnosed in utero with life-threatening conditions, represents an acute manifestation of the virtues of acknowledged dependence, and thus,

[38] «MIS Quarterly», 36/2 (2012), pp. 649-676.
[39] «Strategic Organization», 16/3 (2018), pp. 323-351.
[40] Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018.
[41] «Business Ethics Quarterly», 22/2 (2012), pp. 405-432.
[42] Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke 2013.
[43] «Business Ethics Quarterly», 24/2 (2014), pp. 229-249.
[44] «Business Ethics Quarterly», 28/4 (2018), pp. 377-400.
[45] «The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy», 41/1 (2016), pp. 25-40.

this form of care should receive broad societal support. In *What Makes a Good Nurse: Why the Virtues are Important for Nurses*,[46] Derek Sellman argues that nursing is best characterized as a MacIntyrean practice. Many other researchers have argued that various professions, both in the medical sector and in other industries, are examples of MacIntyrean practices. Arguably, the application of MacIntyre's concept of a practice to professional ethics represents one of the most important implications of his work.

A contrasting perspective complements the previous work discussed in this section. Paul Blackledge, a longtime Marxist reader of MacIntyre's work, in *Marxism and Ethics: Freedom, Desire, and Revolution*,[47] picks up on MacIntyre's criticisms of Marxism's "ethical deficit" and argues that MacIntyre's work provides a means of addressing this deficit. In making this argument, Blackledge offers an account of labor organizing that draws upon MacIntyre's notion of goods, virtues, practices, and institutions. Surprisingly, the work drawing upon the MacIntyrean schema in business ethics has had little to say about issues concerning labor relations and organizing; Blackledge's work may offer a fruitful source for future research concerning the intersection of practice-bearing institutions and organized labor. A related book by John Gregson, *Marxism, Ethics and Politics: The Work of Alasdair MacIntyre*,[48] focuses on the continuing relevance of Marx to MacIntyre's later work.

2. 2. *Narratives: Reason and the Self*

MacIntyre's (AV, p. 216) claim that, «man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal» has continued to provoke debate. The most prominent criticisms of MacIntyre's account were set forth by Galen Strawson[49] but his recently published *Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, Etc.*[50] restates some of his arguments. According to Strawson (p. 16), MacIntyre's view is part of «an oppressive consensus», which states that «anyone who lives their life in a way that is remotely well adjusted necessarily lives it in a "narrative" fashion,» Strawson understands MacIntyre's view to amount to claim about the nature of experience. Such persons, argues Strawson (p. 34), «experience their lives in terms of something that has shape and story, a narrative trajectory», and «wrongly assume that everyone else does the same». MacIntyre's responds directly to Strawson in ECM (4.13) arguing that his view is not a claim about *experience* but is rather a claim about how one must make sense of one's life in the face of conflict, failure, and uncertainty.

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[46] Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London 2011.
[47] State University of New York Press, Albany (NY) 2012.
[48] Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2019.
[49] *Against Narrativity*, «Ratio (New Series)», 17/4 (2004), pp. 428-452.
[50] New York Review of Books, New York 2018.

It should be noted that others have adopted similar interpretations of MacIntyre's claims about narrativity. Richard Moran, in his 2015 Aquinas Lecture, given at Marquette University and published as *The Story of My Life: Narrative and Self-Understanding*,[51] offers a similar interpretation to that of Strawson, claiming that MacIntyre's account of narrativity must refer to the character of experience. By contrast, Fleur Jongepier, in *Towards a Constitutive Account of Implicit Narrativity*,[52] argues that while MacIntyre's account of narrativity does *not* posit a narrative character to human experience, it ought to have made this claim. About experience, Jongpier says

It is implicitly narrative not because there is something like an articulable narrative that you can, if needed, express and make public; it is implicitly narrative because your capacities for narrative self-interpretation have become an integral part of your (occurrent) experiential life (p. 61).

As MacIntyre notes in ECM, his claims about narrative are ultimately claims about the need for and the possibility of achieving self-knowledge. While MacIntyre's claims about narrativity have been of much interest to phenomenologists, the relevance of MacIntyre's account of narrativity to discussions of the role of self-consciousness in neo-Aristotelian virtue theory have been less often noted.[53] Future work might seek to explore the ways that MacIntyre's focus on narrativity contrasts with that of other neo-Aristotelians.

A final article offers an interesting application of MacIntyre's notion of the narrative unity of life, drawing upon the writings of St Josemaría Escrivá, the Spanish saint and founder of Opus Dei. In *From Aristotle's Ethics to St. Josemaria's Divine Comedy: Practice and Narrative as Constitutive Components of Human Work*, Robert A. Gahl, Jr.[54] draws upon Macntyre's concept of narrative to «elucidate the strength and the promise of St. Josemaría's vision for work as a significant component of the child of God's dramatic performance of a divine comedy» (p. 301). Gahl's paper is especially interesting given MacIntyre's recent discussion of the importance of spirituality and the experience of God for an adequate account of the theistic perspective.[55]

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[51] Marquette University Press, Milwaukee (wi) 2015.

[52] «Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences», 15/1 (2016), pp. 51-66.

[53] For relevant discussions of this question, see M. Haase, *Practically Self-Conscious Life*, in J. Hacker-Wright (ed.), *Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2018, pp. 85-126.

[54] G. Faro (ed.), *Pensando il lavoro: Atti del Convegno 'The Heart of Work'*, Pontificia Università della Santa Croce, Roma, 19-20 ottobre 2017, edusc, Roma 2018, pp. 301-314.

[55] *How to Be a Theistic Philosopher in a Secularized Culture*, discussed above.

2. 3. *Tradition and Critique*

Rahel Jaeggi's recently translated *Critique of Forms of Life*,[56] draws upon MacIntyre concept of a practice and his notion of the rationality of traditions to develop a left-Hegelian approach to social critique. Her concern, in part, is to think about ways of theorizing social progress from within different life forms without merely employing external evaluative standards and MacIntyre's notion of progress within practices and traditions informs her approach.[57] Arguably, Jaeggi's approach to social critique could usefully inform MacIntyrean approaches to business ethics by providing a way of thinking about both the values inherent within a given form of life, i.e., capitalist corporations, and the ways that such forms of life could be improved.

In *Reason, Tradition, and the Good: MacIntyre's Tradition-Constituted Reason and Frankfurt School Critical Theory*, Jeffery Nicholas[58] adopts a related approach, arguing that MacIntyre's tradition-constituted reason provides resources for furthering the Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental reason. In this light, Nicholas writes, «Modernity is infected; it is infected by a reason that refuses to evaluate and question» (p. 5). Like Jaeggii, Nicholas rejects the distinction between the right and good, focusing on Habermas and drawing upon Charles Taylor's criticisms of this view. But unlike Jaeggi, Nicholas argues that Thomism offers a distinct source of substantive rationality capable of addressing problems traditionally of concern amongst critical theorists, i.e., domination, ideology, and capitalist social relations. Nicholas does not develop a critical application of the Thomist tradition to the contemporary firm, but one wonders to what extent his account of capitalists firms would differ from that of Moore (discussed above).

A recent article by James Matthew Wilson, *On Poetic Traditions: T.S. Eliot, Alasdair MacIntyre, and the Practice of Reason*,[59] illustrates the remarkable scope of MacIntyre's appeal. Where Jaeggi and Nicholas draw on MacIntyre's notion of tradition to inform and extend the radical project of critical theory initiated by the likes of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, Wilson wants

to call into question the stark contrast MacIntyre has drawn between his understanding of tradition and Burke's, and to attend more critically to Eliot's by the way suggestion that the historical sense of tradition involves not just an active consciousness but also a role for the passive or "unconscious" as Burke might have understood it (p. 766).

[56] Belknap Press, Cambridge (MA) 2018.
[57] For this point see also N. Fraser and R. Jaeggi, *Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2018.
[58] University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (IN) 2012.
[59] «Communio», 44 (Winter 2017), pp. 747-786.

Even radical critics of Wilson's more conservative approach would do well to pay attention to his argument as it raises questions concerning the nature of MacIntyre's tradition-constituted reason. In *Alasdair MacIntyre's Tradition-Constituted Enquiry: An Alternative to Relativism and Fideism*, Christopher Lutz[60] offers a sympathetic reading of MacIntyre's account of tradition-constituted inquiry, while illustrating its application to the interpretation of Aquinas's Five Ways, and cautioning against a lack of sensitivity to differences between rival traditions.

2. 4. *MacIntyrean Politics*

ECM represents the most comprehensive statement of MacIntyre's distinctive vision of neo-Aristotelian politics. One argument running through the text concerns the inadequacy of, what MacIntyre calls, "Morality", a term describing the central concept of modern moral philosophy and practice. While MacIntyre argues that these concepts – concepts such as rights, utility, and universalizability – despite their incoherence, are often employed together to govern social life in modernity, his charge of incoherence raises important questions. More specifically, it is not clear that the mere existence of conflicting norms entails incoherence, so Robert Pippin argues in *Alasdair MacIntyre's Modernity*[61]. Drawing upon Hegel, Pippin argues that notions of rights, duty, and virtue can not only be combined in a complex and coherent fashion, but as Hegel argues, these concepts are necessary to capture the contours of human agency. Regardless, in the light of Pippin's essay it seems clear that the argument of ECM cannot be adequately evaluated without a confrontation with Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

As noted above, *Virtue and Politics* offers an important collection of articles discussing the political implications of MacIntyre's work. Many of the articles discuss MacIntyre's relationship with Marxism. Alex Callinicos's *Two Cheers for Enlightenment Universalism: Or, Why It's Hard to Be an Aristotelian Revolutionary* (pp. 54-78) raises a crucial question for MacIntyre's relationship to Marx: How should one understand the rise of capitalism? Callinicos argues that Marx's account of capitalism is inherently dialectical, as it both highlights the limitations of capitalism and notes the ways in which capitalism, especially in its origins, represents an improvement upon previous social conditions. Unlike Marx, MacIntyre's narrative of the rise of modernity (including the rise of capitalism) is almost completely negative. Thus, a bet-

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[60] «American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly», 85/33 (2011), pp. 619-640.
[61] In *Interanimations: Receiving Modern German Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2015, pp. 235-257.

ter understanding of the origins of capitalism may shed light on contemporary debates.

Also noteworthy is Kelvin Knight's *Revolutionary Aristotelianism* (pp. 20-34). In this article, Knight offers a definitive statement of MacIntyre's radical political perspective, which should put to rest the suggestion that MacIntyre's politics is either communitarian or conservative. According to Knight,

[T]he rationale of MacIntyre's social theory of practices is that the bases of these certain forms of community are to be found no longer in locality, but rather than in particular practices" (p. 32).

As Knight argues, MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian politics centers upon conflict concerning the common goods of practices and institutions. This account of politics is illustrated in ECM (Chapter 4), where MacIntyre moves seamlessly from discussions of common goods in families, workplaces, and local communities. In the light of Knight's account of MacIntyre's politics, one can also appreciate the initially surprising interest in business ethics amongst some of MacIntyre's interpreters, since organizations are important loci of conflict between the internal goods of practices and the external goods needed to support and sustain practices. The other articles in this collection are also well worth reading.

Virtue and Economy, which includes MacIntyre's *The Irrelevance of Ethics* (discussed above), also includes a number of additional papers, many of them presented at a conference focused on the economic implications of MacIntyre's thought at Vilnius, Lithuania in 2010. As might be expected, many of these papers focus on the importance of political conflict in the face of neoliberal economic policies. John O'Neill's contribution to this collection, *Equality, Vulnerability, and Independence* (pp. 75-93), offers an insightful comparison of MacIntyre's discussion of vulnerability in *Dependent Rational Animals* with similar considerations in Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. O'Neill explains why the acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability under egalitarian conditions can avoid the servile social conditions that Smith feared. Using this analysis, the author explains the implications of MacIntyre's account of vulnerability for the provisions of social services by modern states, showing the relevance of *Dependent Rational Animals* for contemporary political debates.

Likewise, a number of the essays in *What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century?* address political issues. Joseph Dunne's *Ethics at the Limits: A Reading of Dependent Rational Animals* (pp. 57-82) offers a radical reading of *Dependent Rational Animals* suggesting that it offers new ways of thinking about the role of the virtues within the more fluid context of modern social conditions. In *Marxism and the Ethos of the Twentieth Century* (pp. 221-243), Raymond Geuss offers an insightful analysis of the dysfunctions stemming from contemporary social conditions. Geuss (p. 239) concludes as follows,

Taking seriously the attempt to abolish the distinction between instrumental and substantive reason, between actions performed merely for the sake of other things and actions performed for their own sake, and finally between means and ends by transforming society in a way that would make these distinctions really marginal and subordinate would, I think, move one beyond the ethos of the twentieth century.

Geuss doubts that this transformation is possible but much of the empirical research drawing upon MacIntyre's practice-institution schema has sought to show that at least in some cases this dichotomy has been overcome.

In a recent symposium in *Perspectives on Political Science*,[62] Christopher J. Wolfe provides the *Introduction to the Symposium: Alasdair MacIntyre and American Politics* (pp. 100-101). Other contributions include Nathan Schlueter's *A Conservative Conversation Worth Having: Alasdair MacIntyre and John Finnis on Morality, Politics and the Common Good* (pp. 102-108), Christopher Lutz's *No One Is Minding the Store: MacIntyre's Critique of Modern Liberal Individualism* (pp. 115-121), and Wolfe's *Some Objections to MacIntyre from Deliberative Democracy* (pp. 109-114), which draws upon empirical evidence concerning legislative discourse to challenge MacIntyre's blanket claims about the irrationality of contemporary politics. Like Schlueter, John Macias, in *John Finnis and Alasdair MacIntyre on Our Knowledge of the Precepts of Natural Law*,[63] investigates the relationship between two of the twentieth century's most important Catholic moral philosophers.

A recent special issue of the journal «Politics & Poetics»,[64] collects a number of papers addressing the political implications of MacIntyre's work. Many of these articles were first presented at a conference at Blackfriars, Oxford, in 2017, dedicated to the reception of ECM. In his contribution, Stephen Salkever argues that

Leo Strauss and Alasdair MacIntyre, two of the most important critics of modernity, share, in spite of their very real differences, a common project: the interpretive revival of the voices of Plato and Aristotle to formulate, for modern purposes, a zetetic or skeptical framework for ethical and political critique that is neither relativistic nor dogmatic, and that cannot be achieved on the basis of mainstream modern moral and political philosophy.[65]

By positioning MacIntyre in relationship to Strauss, Salkever's article opens up new avenues of investigation concerning the political implications of MacIntyre's thought.

[62] «Perspectives on Political Science», 44 (2015).
[63] «Res Philosophica», 93/1 (2016), pp. 103-123.
[64] «Politics & Poetics», 4 (2018): *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity. A Special Edition on the Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre*.
[65] S. SALKEVER, *On* Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity*: MacIntyre, Strauss, and Modern Aristotelianism*, «Politics & Poetics», 4 (2018), cit., p. 1.

Similarly, Geoffry Sigalet[66] draws upon Jeremy Waldron's work to challenge the adequacy of MacIntyre's account of the political institutions needed to embody a genuinely Aristotelian politics. In the same issue is Tamas Paár's insightful comparison of MacIntyre's mode of argument with that common amongst proponents of transcendental Thomism. [67] While not directly speaking of political issues, Paár addresses an issue that has animated ecclesiastical debate within the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council, that of the extent to which modern culture offers positive resources to be appropriated by Catholic scholars. Paár's surprising claim is that MacIntyre is in some ways much closer to transcendental Thomism than might be expected.

In *Faith, Realism, and Universal Reason: MacIntyrean Reflections on* Fides et Ratio,[68] Mats Wahlberg addresses another recent point of ecclesiastical-cum-political debate: *The Role of Thomism within the Catholic Church after Vatican II. Revisiting MacIntyre's (1994) reading of* Fides et Ratio, Wahlberg argues that John Paul II

brings out the importance of metaphysical realism for a correct understanding of human nature and shows that faith itself can be correctly understood only against the background of humanity's universal quest for truth (p. 1336),

reaffirming MacIntyre's claim that the Catholic Church, despite its recognition of the legitimacy of different theological traditions, is committed to the fundamental claims of Thomism, including its strong defence of metaphysical realism.

2. 5. *MacIntyre in a Broader Perspective*

Also noteworthy is Thomas Pfau's *Minding the Modern: Human Agency, Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge*,[69] and Brad Gregory's *The Unintended Reformation.*[70] Both books are not so much devoted to defending particular aspects of MacIntyre's project as illustrations of the fundamental influence of MacIntyre's philosophical method. Through an erudite reading of classical texts spanning from Aristotle and Augustine to Coleridge and beyond, Pfau seeks to show that modernity has lost crucial concepts related to the notions of intellect, will, and agency leading to a barren form of voluntarism.

Gregory complements this approach by offering a comprehensive history

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[66] G. Sigalet, *Waldron's Challenge to Aristotelians: On the Political Relevance of Moral Realism*, «Politics & Poetics», 4 (2018), cit.

[67] T. Paár, *Retorting Arguments, Overcoming Limitations, Aiming at Truth: A Comparison of MacIntyre and Transcendental Neo-Thomism*, «Politics & Poetics», 4 (2018), cit.

[68] «Nova et Vetera», English Edition, 16/4 (2018), pp. 1313-1336.

[69] Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame (IN) 2015.

[70] Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2012.

of the effects of the Reformation, arguing that the breakdown of Christendom, lead to the marginalization of small communities of virtue and the rise of modernity. In offering this history, Gregory provides a sophisticated historical account that dovetails with the intellectual history of the breakdown of the tradition of the virtues that MacIntyre elaborated in *After Virtue*, though Gregory places greater weight on the Reformation than MacIntyre had initially claimed. A weakness of Gregory's account is its somewhat Pollyannaish account of pre-Reformation communities, making it hard to understand how something like the Reformation could even have occurred.

Jason Blakely's *Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and the Demise of Naturalism: Reunifying Political Theory and Social Science*,[71] should be widely read, as it offers a compelling account of MacIntyre's philosophy of social science. The author's grouping of Taylor and MacIntyre is particularly interesting given MacIntyre's recent comments about Taylor's relevance to social scientific theories (noted above). One primary aim of Blakely's book is to show how MacIntyre and Taylor challenge the fact-value dichotomy. Commenting upon MacIntyre critique of this dichotomy, Blakely (p. 90) writes,

[A] theory about how to best explain human agency necessarily entails judgments about the reasonableness of rival conceptualizations. The rationality guiding social science is thus normative of the rationality guiding actual social actors in the world.

MacIntyre's point, as Blakely notes, is that social scientists necessarily bring value judgments about what sorts of actions are reasonable and what sorts are not. These judgments shape efforts at explaining social behavior since actions that are viewed as reasonable typically require very different explanations from actions that are not. For example, in much economic theory, explanations of utility maximization are seen as reasonable and, because of this, do not require additional explanation. By contrast, explanations of failures to maximize utility typically require some additional explanation. This has provided the basis for much research in behavioral economics. Concerning the asymmetry of success and failure, MacIntyre's account of the explanation of agency relates closely with that of Sebastian Rödl[72]. By making these value judgments explicit researchers may open up new avenues of exploration. Readers should also look for Blakely's recently published book with Mark Bevir, *Interpretive Social Science: An Anti-Naturalist Approach*,[73] which also draws upon MacIntyre's work.

Last but not least, in *Existence, Meaning, Excellence: Aristotelian Reflections on the Meaning of Life*,[74] Andrius Bielskis offers a fascinating attempt to address

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[71] University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (IN) 2016.
[72] S. RÖDL, *Self-Consciousness*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2007.
[73] Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019.
[74] Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames 2017.

a perennial philosophical problem: The question of the meaning of life. He brings this problem into focus by first exploring the ways in which the meaning of life became problematized in the work of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. For Bielskis, it is only by turning to Aristotle's practical philosophy, as it has been modified and developed by MacIntyre, that we can get a grip on the question of the meaning of life. He concludes,

My main thesis is, indeed, in line with the claim that the quest for the meaning of life can be accomplished satisfactorily only in our pursuit of excellence – both moral and creative excellence (pp. 127-128).

And for Bielskis, the only way this pursuit can get off of the ground is insofar as human life is understood to be directed toward a *telos* that transcends individual preferences and desires.

3. CONCLUSION

While far from exhaustive, even considering English language literature, in this Thematic Bibliography, I have sought to give some indication of the breadth of MacIntyre's influence. What seems clear is that MacIntyre's work has had a large impact outside of analytic moral philosophy and even outside of Thomism. This is perhaps to be expected, given MacIntyre's focus on the importance of practice. Two challenges face MacIntyre's interpreters, especially applied ethicists, social scientists, and historians, drawing upon his work. First, MacIntyre's moral philosophy developed through a critical and often technical engagement with analytic moral philosophy. As researchers in various disciplines draw upon MacIntyre's work, it is important that his conceptual framework does not lose its vitality and become formulaic, avoiding this will likely require a renewed effort to engage with current trends in moral philosophy. Arguably, similar considerations apply to the discipline of political theory.

Second, MacIntyre has consistently maintained that the importance of his work derives largely from its efforts in pointing toward the need to reappropriate the work of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Marx. While this suggestion fails to register MacIntyre's originality and distinct contribution to the Aristotelian tradition, it does highlight the need to continuously link the old with the new. More specifically, as researchers in various fields draw upon MacIntyre's conceptual framework, it is necessary to contextualize this framework both by drawing directly upon the works of key figures from the philosophical tradition, but also by incorporating key insights from classical scholars and historians of philosophy. By crossing disciplinary boundaries MacIntyrean inquiry is challenging but also potentially groundbreaking.