HOW CAN WE LIVE IN THE COMMON WORLD? TRUTH, BEING-WITH AND THE WORLD IN THE EARLY HEIDEGGER

Min Seol*

SUMMARY: *1. Introduction: The Problem of the Common World in the Early Heidegger. 2. Critical Questions about the Commonality of the World. 3. Review of Alternatives as proposed by Schatzki and Dreyfus. 4. The Redefinition of the World based on Truth and Being-with. 5. Conclusion: Explaining the Compatibility of My World and the World.*

1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMON WORLD IN THE EARLY HEIDEGGER

ONE of the most important achievements in phenomenology has involved launching an inquiry into the world that is not identical with the totality of objectifiable entities but in which we always – and already – participate as living beings. In *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger construes the human being as "Being-in-the-world," and the concept of world – which had been forgotten in traditional metaphysics in favor of a focus on the concept of cosmos or of nature – emerges as one of the main themes of his philosophy. He ontologically distinguishes entities such as chairs, trees, atoms, numbers, and letters from the world, as the world is not merely a sum of individual entities. Instead, the world is a whole realm of meaning and truth possibilities within which each entity can be what it is.

We also live in the same realm, but we form the world on our own, unlike any other entity in the world. While each entity is *discovered* in the world, each of us *discloses* the world. Each of us discloses it in different ways depending on his or her temporal, local, and historical situation as well as on his or her accumulated past experiences and teleological projects. Given this, should not the world that I disclose and the one disclosed by another be different from each other? It seems natural to say that my world and the world of another are somewhat different. Yet, if each world is disclosed to each of us, how can there be a common world in which we live together?[1]

* Pusan National University, Busandaehakro 63beongil 2, Geumjeonggu, Busan 46241, South Korea. E-mail: mmmiinnn@gmail.com

[1] In *Being and Time* Heidegger makes little effort to analyze the relationship between my

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger poses a series of questions before analyzing the world concept:

Is 'world' perhaps a characteristic of Dasein's Being? And in that case, does every Dasein 'proximally' have its world? Does not 'world' thus become something 'subjective'? How, then, can there be a 'common' world 'in' which, nevertheless, we *are*?"[2]

In Heidegger's fundamental ontology, it is obvious that the world is a characteristic of *Dasein*.[3] It is disclosed by *Dasein*. However, *"Dasein"* is a term for "each of us," characterized by "mineness."[4] Therefore, it seems as if the world is to be considered individualistic and subjective, and the world disclosed to all of us in common would be conceptually impossible.

How can there be a common world beyond the walls of "mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*)"? In other words, how can the world be disclosed to me as well as to others in common? If these questions are raised in the framework of a traditional philosophy of consciousness that tacitly regards consciousness as a subject isolated from the object, they could be answered using two approaches. In the first approach, if the conscious subject is assumed to be a kind of substance – that is, a self-sufficient entity in a strict sense – its perceived world must belong to itself. In this Leibnizian type of answer, the subject as a windowless monad has its own world within its consciousness. The commonness of the world results from a consensus among every particular world, which can only be explained by the metaphysical assumption of pre-established harmony by the divine intellect. In the second approach,

world and the world, but he states clearly that "Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of *its* world." M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Harper, New York 1964, p. 186. Emphasis mine. Heidegger frequently uses the term "its world (seine Welt)".

  [2] *Ibidem*, p. 92. The passage has been highlighted in H. L. Dreyfus, *The Priority of The World to My World: Heidegger's Answer to Husserl (and Sartre)*, «Man and World», 8 (1975), pp. 121-130, p. 121.

  [3] *"Ontologically, 'world' is … a characteristic of Dasein itself."* M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, cit., p. 92.

  [4] *"This entity which each of us is himself …, we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'."* *Ibidem*, p. 27. See also p. 68. Heidegger rarely uses *'Dasein'* as a count noun (exceptionally see M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 2, Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1977, pp. 161, 181, 225, 325, 445), but this is simply because the term is intended to "stand for *any* person who has such Being, and who is thus an 'entity' himself," as translators of *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, comment on the use of the term *'Dasein.'* See M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, cit., p. 27. I agree with T. Carman, when he says that "the term 'Dasein' refers to any individual human being or person." For his overall comments on the question of how the term *'Dasein'* should be understood, see T. Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 35-43 (the quotation, p. 35).

the traditional philosophy of consciousness that rejects such a metaphysical assumption is apt to rely on the transcendental concept of subject. Each subject constitutes a world. As long as the world exists based on my faculty of constitution, it is in the first place a world *for* me, which should be thus called my world. Nevertheless, my world coincides, to a considerable extent, with a world that another subject constitutes. There seem to be two reasons for this coincidence. First, there are common forms of constitution that inhere in all subjects, as Kant speaks of space and time as a priori intuitions and of categories as a priori concepts. Second, it is assumed that the thing-in-itself remains the same regardless of subjective experiences. This second type of answer explains the coherence of subjective worlds based on both the identity (i.e., commonness) of pure subjectivity and the identity (i.e., self-sameness) of pure objectivity.

In the traditional philosophy of consciousness, the world is regarded in the first place as a solipsistic world, a world belonging to each subject; thus, it becomes a subjective worldview. The common world comes to be established as a common denominator that is universally consistent with those subjective worldviews. The universally consistent parts among the subjective worlds are constructed into the single world that is construed to be common and objective.

From Heidegger's phenomenological point of view, the above answers are unsatisfactory in many respects. Even a transcendental philosophy of consciousness that seeks to circumvent a metaphysical assumption is firmly attached to the dichotomous scheme of subject and object. Both the self-sameness of the isolated pure object and the commonness of the faculty of constitution inherent in all subjects would be also regarded by Heidegger as theoretical assumptions based on an erroneous scheme that distorts our Being as Being-in-the-world. In addition, the assumptions that the world is conceptualized in the first place as a solipsistic world belonging to each consciousness, and that the common world is a construct resulting from it, are, in his view, far away from the phenomenological fact that we are always already living in a common world.

In Heidegger's phenomenology, I, or *Dasein*, is not an inner consciousness isolated from the outside. *Dasein* is not a self-sufficient substance but *open* to the world. I can exist only as long as I am open to the world. In this sense, *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world is not self-reliant. It can exist only in the place where entities can be discovered as such-and-such. We have always already entered a place that Heidegger called "there (*da*)" or "clearing (*Lichtung*)."

The world is disclosed differently to each of us. However, the world that is disclosed is not the percept within the inner consciousness of a windowless monad, nor the worldview constituted by the transcendental subject. My world is open to all other *Dasein*. Therefore, in the analysis of *Dasein* devel-

oped in *Being and Time*, there is no place for solipsism.[5] However, the solution of the problem of solipsism is not itself an answer to the question about the possibility of a common world-disclosure – namely how can the world be disclosed jointly by us, despite its being disclosed at the same time differently from person to person? In what manner can my world be open to others? Moreover, what does it mean to say that my world is open to others?

2. Critical Questions about the Commonality of the World

The question of how the world can be one for all of us despite the particularity of our existence has been studied extensively by the late Frederick A. Olafson, one of the principal interpreters of the thoughts of Martin Heidegger in the English-speaking world.[6] He asks how the plurality of *Dasein* and the singularity of the (common) world can be compatible with the fundamental ontological assumption that the world is conditioned by *Dasein*. If the world, or "milieu of presence" in his phrase, is dependent on the existence of *Dasein* and there are multiple *Dasein*, then milieu of presence, he argues, should also be multiple. However, if there are multiple milieus of presence, there would additionally have to be a common world in which they converge. How is such convergence possible? According to him, these questions are not properly dealt with by Heidegger.[7] Olafson believes that a strong theory of Being-with must be advanced to claim the commonality of the world despite the multiplicity of *Dasein*. The problem is, he thinks, that Heidegger did not present such a theory in his works.

Also, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, whose political ideas are much indebted to Heidegger – although with totally different underlying concerns – raises critical questions concerning Heidegger in a similar vein to Olafson. Pointing out that in *Being and Time* Heidegger did not undertake "the analysis of the way in which many *Dasein* can be the *there together*," he raises several questions: "What kind of *there* for many? A common *there* or the *there* of each? But then, brought together in what way?"[8]

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[5] For Heidegger's overcoming of solipsism and the problem of intersubjectivity, see the following informative studies. S. Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, Routledge, London 2013, pp. 61f.; H. Hall, *The Other Minds Problem in Early Heidegger*, «Human Studies», 3 (1980), pp. 247-254; F. R. Dallmayr, *Heidegger on Intersubjectivity*, «Human Studies», 3 (1980), pp. 221-246.

[6] The secondary literature considered in my paper could appear somewhat restricted, but the question covered in it was brought up by Olafson and indeed mainly discussed in the English-speaking world.

[7] See F. A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1987, pp. 70, 146, 238f.; F. A. Olafson, *The Unity of Heidegger's Thought*, in C. Guignon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, p. 108.

[8] J.-L. Nancy, *The Being-with of Being-there*, «Continental Philosophy Review», 41 (2008), pp. 1-15, p. 4.

Nancy refers to three possibilities for the way *Dasein* coexist *there* – that is, in the place of manifestation of entities in their Being. The first is the way in which "each opens its own *da* for itself" and combines them externally. The second is the way in which the place opened by each is unified internally and merged into a single body. The third, as different from the two extremes of external combination and internal unification, is the way in which the "openings intersect each other in some way", "without merging into a unique *Dasein*." However, according to Nancy, the first and second modes undermine the principle of the essentiality of the *with*. The external combination makes the Being-with of human beings fall back into the juxtaposition of things, and the internal unification overshoots the unity so that the individuals who should be together are dissolved simply into a single body.

In analyzing these possible answers, Nancy points out that the first way corresponds politically to democracy as understood by Heidegger and his contemporaries – that is, individualism – and the second way leads to totalitarianism. He then interprets that the first way in *Being and Time* is regarded as inauthentic Being-with-others under the name of the *they*, while the second way is regarded as authentic Being-with-others under the name of "people (*Volk*)." According to him, the transition from the former to the latter is too extreme to be persuasive. Nancy therefore finds an alternative in the third way. He argues that *Dasein* can exist together in a way that opens up their respective *there*, which are intertwined, intermingled, and intercrossed with each other.

Nancy considers that Heidegger's thought is far from solipsism. He criticizes Heidegger, however, in that, in *Being and Time* and subsequent works, it is not fully explained in what manner *Dasein* exists with others, and that the possibility of coexistence is concealed, lost, or suppressed between the *they* and people. Nancy's interests are, of course, political rather than ontological. However, exactly in the same way as Olafson, he raises a question of how, despite the particularity and multiplicity of *Dasein*, the commonality of *there* or the world is possible. Like Olafson, he also suspects that a clue for the answer may be obtained from the concept of Being-with, which Heidegger failed to develop.

2. 3. *Review of Alternatives as proposed by Schatzki and Dreyfus*

Dasein opens the clearing in which every entity reveals its Being. Nancy asked whether it is disclosed individually or jointly. Nancy himself seems to take the position according to which each clearing is at first disclosed individually and then gains commonality by intersecting with other clearings. Olafson, on the other hand, supposes that "there can be only one clearing," according to the idea of later Heidegger, who does not start from the "mineness" of *Dasein*.[9]

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[9] F.A. OLAFSON, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, cit., p. 231.

Against Olafson's criticism, Theodore R. Schatzki, who studies social life mainly based on Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's philosophies, defends Heidegger's fundamental ontology. He summarizes Olafson's doubts as follows: "How do the facts (1) that human existence is a clearing, (2) that there is a plurality of people and thus, presumably, a plurality of clearings, and (3) that being [or world] is unique and singular, cohere?" In contradistinction to the uniqueness of the "clearing," as Olafson argues, Schatzki posits at first as many "numerically distinct clearings" as the number of *Dasein*. He then argues that due to "dimensions" that support the "commonality between [multiple] clearings" the oneness of the world is assured without falling into the difficulties Olafson points out.[10] Like Nancy, he acknowledges the pluralism of the clearing, but he thinks the oneness of the world is possible based on the common constituents among the respective clearings. Yet, unlike Nancy, he specifies dimensions that support commonality.

On the basis of *Being and Time*, he identifies three dimensions. The first dimension involves "universal features of the notion of being as such" which include some of Heidegger's own categories, such as "present-at-hand," "ready-to-hand," and "being-there-with" as well as traditional metaphysical categories, such as "that-, how-, and what-being." The second dimension, which certifies the commonality between clearings, includes socio-historical categories – that is, the *they* and tradition. Schatzki argues that the nature of *they*, as comprising forms and styles of behavior that dominate human daily life, explains the fact that "clearings are largely the same, i.e., are constituted largely by the same (anyone) possibilities." Furthermore, in suggesting that, based on the last part of *Being and Time*, "a range of possibilities that is broader than that offered by the anyone [*das Man*]" is presented in tradition, he avoids Olafson's point that the *they* is confined to the inauthentic mode of existence. The third dimension is "one and the same realm of present-at-hand entities entering each clearing." He appeals to the realistic idea of the identity of pure nature, which is very close to the idea mentioned in the introduction.[11]

Schatzki's answer seems very similar to that of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness. The universality of categories and the identity of present-at-hand entities correspond structurally to the universality of the subjective form and the identity of the pure object, respectively. Both are metaphysical postulates to bring about the commonality of the world – not facts to

[10] In order, T. R. SCHATZKI, *Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing and Realism*, in H. DREYFUS and H. HALL (eds.), *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford 1992, pp. 81-98, pp. 84f., 88, 87. Parentheses mine. Strictly speaking, he speaks only of "the singularity and uniqueness of the being and reality" (p. 87). Nevertheless, because he would surely agree to the singularity of the world, my reformulation does not distort his position.

[11] In order, *ibidem*, pp. 87, 89, 90, 91.

be phenomenologically confirmed. However, according to Heidegger's method of phenomenological explanation, one could argue that the possibility of the universality of categories and the identity of nature should be explained on the ground of the common world. In other words, is not the oneness of the world a possible condition in which categories of Being can be universal, and nature can be one and the same for all of us?

According to the analyses by Nancy and Schatzki, every clearing is disclosed to each of us and the single world results from their unification. Again, as in the answer of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness, each clearing is ontologically prior to the world in the sense that the oneness of the world can be established only after the confirmation of the commonality among clearings. However, it seems that the world is then bound to be an objective ideal to be agreed with intersubjectively. But for Heidegger, the world is by no means such an ideal. For him, it should be ontologically prior to each particular clearing. He would say that the world has already been universally disclosed and that, as each person projects it respectively, each clearing is disclosed particularly.[12]

The Nancy-Schatzkian answer involves a tacit assumption for the ontological priority of the individual world-disclosure. The late Hubert L. Dreyfus, whose works on Heidegger and phenomenology are highly influential in the Anglo-Saxon world, on the other hand, argues that *the* world is prior to *my* world. He suggests that the ontological priority of the world to my world is a critical point that marked off Heidegger's philosophy from the philosophy of Husserl or Sartre.

According to Dreyfus, in Husserl, the individual transcendental ego constitutes its own world by way of meaning-giving activity. Heidegger, on the other hand, places the source of meaning and intelligibility in a public existence that has lost "mineness."

The public's insensitivity to differences, indeed its concern to suppress them by conformity or cooption, is necessary if there is to be any intelligibility at all. If there were not generally accepted ways to use tools, to eat, to build

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[12] Of course, a criticism that the Nancy-Schatzkian answer implies the metaphysical subjectification of *Dasein,* as in the transcendental philosophy of consciousness, would be a misconstruction. Their thesis that each opens his or her clearing respectively cannot mean that each owns his or her clearing privatively. It is because they start from the assumption of fundamental ontology that *Dasein* and clearing cannot be divided into subject and object. Nancy says that *"I can only open myself there* by opening at the same time onto other *theres*, as we say of a door that it opens onto a *garden."* J.-L. NANCY, *The Being-with of Being-there*, cit., p. 10. As long as each *there* is open to other *theres*, and they are intersected and intermingled so that a common world is established, there is no possibility for solipsistic subject. Yet, Nancy as well as Schatzki give no adequate explanation of how each of these clearings can be open to the other.

houses, and – most important – to use sounds as language, there would be no society and no understanding. A very important way of explaining something – say, a hammer – is to show someone what *one* does with it.[13]

In short, Dreyfus construes the *they* – namely, "the public 'conceptual scheme'" – to be a source of meaning and intelligibility. Therefore, the world, as a whole comprising the intelligibility of entities, must be disclosed in public. It is not, as in the Nancy-Schatzkian answer, that the world is established based on the commonalities between all clearings *after* each opens his or her own clearing respectively, but that it is *in the first place* disclosed in common by the *they*.

Dreyfus' interpretation does not make the common world an *a posteriori* construct like an objective ideal, nor assumes the universality of categories or the realistic identity of nature metaphysically. Yet, there are some issues here to be examined. First, Dreyfus relies heavily on the concept of the *they* in claiming the priority of the common world. However, as revealed in the Dreyfus-Olafson controversy,[14] it is at least arguable that the influence of the *they* cannot be applied irrespective of the mode of existence.

Second, a question can be raised as to what extent the claim that the common world takes precedence over the respective clearings can be textually inferred from *Being and Time*, which posits that the world is constituted through the instrumental context of "referential" relatedness – such as the "towards-which (*Wo-zu*)" and the "where-at (*Wobei*)" – and that this context of relatedness goes back finally to the "for-the-sake-of (*Worum-willen*)" of each *Dasein*.[15] This "'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of *Dasein*, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an *issue*."[16] This concept of the world is, differently from Dreyfus' interpretation, essentially associated with "mineness." Furthermore, in *Being and Time* the world-disclosure is said to be based on temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), which is explained as the ontological basis of *Dasein*.[17] However, the temporalization of temporality pertains to each *Dasein*.[18] This assumption of fundamental ontology certainly fits better with the Nan-

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[13] H. L. DREYFUS, *The Priority of The World to My World*, cit., p. 124.

[14] Olafson is strongly opposed to the interpretation that the *they* is also acting on authentic existence. The considerable bibliography on his dispute with Dreyfus is well documented in note 4 of E. C. BOEDEKER Jr., *Individual and Community in Early Heidegger: Situating das Man, the Man-self, and Self-ownership in Dasein's Ontological Structure*, «Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy», 44/1 (2001), pp. 63-99, p. 93.

[15] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, cit., pp. 118-119.   [16] *Ibidem*, pp. 116f.

[17] See *Ibidem*, pp. 277, 351, 401-402.

[18] One of the authorities is that the mode of temporalization of temporality is divided into authenticity and inauthenticity, which is dependent on each particular existence. Another authority is Heidegger's own expression of "the temporality of the *individual* Dasein". *Ibidem*, p. 477. Emphasis mine.

cy-Schatzkian answer, in which the disclosure of the respective clearings has a priority over the disclosure of the common world.

The first issue concerning Dreyfus' priority thesis that the common world relies on the *they* can be somewhat alleviated by insights derived from Boedeker (2001). According to him, the *they* and the *they-self* should be strictly distinguished.[19] The former is an existential category, while the latter is restricted to the inauthentic mode. The source of meaning and possibility of understanding is not the *they-self*, but the *they*. Authentic existence does not deviate from the *they*, but modifies it so that the meaning and the possibility of understanding can be acquired appropriately. According to Boedeker (2001), it may be possible to claim the priority of the common world based on the *they* irrespective of the mode of existence.

However, it seems difficult to eliminate a second issue concerning whether the priority thesis of the common world is sufficiently consistent with *Being and Time*. The fundamental ontological assumptions that the world is centered around my *for-the-sake-of* or that the individual temporalization of temporality is the driving force of world-disclosure make it hard to accept that thesis.

Other than these issues, there is another matter to consider. In Section 18 of *Being and Time*, the worldhood of the world is explained as "significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*)." This expression implies that the world is the primordial source of meaning and intelligibility from which any entity can be meaningfully revealed. Yet, the definition of the world as significance or the relationship between world and meaning seems to be insufficient to elucidate the worldhood of the world; already in Section 44 of *Being and Time* Heidegger touches on another character of the world – namely, a relationship between world and truth, which becomes more important in his later works.

Following Dreyfus to a certain point, I maintain that the common world-disclosure is prior to the individual world-disclosure. However, because of the limits of his approach discussed above, I consider his thesis needs further development. In the next section, I argue that the priority of common world-disclosure can be ascertained based on the relationship among truth, Being-with and world.

3. 4. *The Redefinition of the World based on Truth and Being-with*

According to Olafson's critique, it is because Heidegger neglected to explore the Being-with that the paradox between the plurality of *Dasein* and the singularity of the world arises. He sees the relationship between Being-with and

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[19] See also C. B. GUIGNON, *Heidegger's "Authenticity" Revisited*, «The Review of Metaphysics», 38/2 (1984), pp. 328-334.

truth as a clue to addressing this paradox. He takes note of the binding charac-
ter of truth, which Heidegger mentions in the winter semester of 1929/30.[20]
Specifically, he highlights that "the binding character that Heidegger attri-
butes to the being of entities, and thus to truth, must have a public or com-
mon character."[21] In his view, Heidegger should have developed the concept
of Being-with in terms of truth.

Olafson's insights, which emphasize the close relationship between truth
and Being-with, are certainly appropriate. However, he did not realize that
Heidegger's lecture in the winter semester of 1928/29 contained a rich debate
on this matter.[22] Over more than a hundred pages, Heidegger elaborates on
the idea that Being-with is nothing more than the sharing of truth.[23] His long
and complex discussion cannot be summarized here. In the following discus-
sion, I condense the important points in the context of this paper into three
theses. Heidegger does not mention the world, so I have added several theses
to his discussion in order to derive the priority of the common world-disclo-
sure based on the essential sharing of truth.

Heidegger first asks what it means ontologically for persons to be together.
Ontologically, the being together of persons seems profoundly different from
the being together of mere entities. Despite this, traditional metaphysics has
conceived of the ontological character of persons being together on the basis
of the concept of mere entities being adjacent to one another. According to
the implicit supposition of this tradition, what is the most real is the substance
of the "present-at-hand," such as natural things. An item such as a table is a
"present-at-hand" thing to which cultural values are added, and a person is
thought to be a physical substance to which a psychic substance is added.[24]
Likewise, the being together of persons is identical to the being adjacent of
physical substances, to which psychological activities are then added. In other
words, all entities – including persons – found together are basically adjacent.
The only difference with persons is that they are adjacent not only spatially
and temporally but also psychologically by recognizing each other.[25]

However, in Heidegger's view, this conception of being together does not
correctly grasp our being together. We are mutually with one another, he says,

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[20] See M. HEIDEGGER, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*.
Gesamtausgabe Bd. 29/30, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, pp. 496-497, 502-503.

[21] F. A. OLAFSON, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, cit., p. 240. See also pp. 238-245.

[22] In fact, OLAFSON could not have seen Heidegger's Winter 1928/29 lecture notes when
he published his research in 1987. The lecture notes were first published in 1996.

[23] M. HEIDEGGER, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 27, Klostermann,
Frankfurt a.M. 1996, pp. 46-155.

[24] The critique of the value theories of the time is one of Heidegger's most important
critiques in *Being and Time*. See M. HEIDEGGER, *Being and Time*, cit., pp. 91, 96, 132.

[25] M. HEIDEGGER, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, cit., p. 86.

even in cases of total indifference to one another; we are absorbed in something common without recognizing one another. In Heidegger's example, although two persons climbing a mountain gaze speechlessly in wonderment at the magnificent scenery of the mountain peak, they do not lack being with each other. Of course, they are not recognizing each other at all. Nevertheless, they are together with one another in a certain way. Therefore, psychological activities such as recognizing each other are not essential in the Being-with.

If we could be together in perfect indifference to each other, how should we understand that persons are together? Heidegger asks what kind of commonality allows the two persons in the mountain to be together while indifferent to each other. The answer seems at first glance to be the sight of the mountain that fascinates them alike. In that case, the Being-with is nothing but being related to the same thing or sharing the same thing. However, what exactly is the same thing at that time?

For example, let us say that two people sit facing each other across a table. What is the same thing they share at this time? Obviously at one level they share a table. However, as a material object, a table cannot be shared by them. Not only does it physically change every moment, but it is deprived of a character *as* a table, as a usable item. The same thing they share is not the physical object, but the fact that the entity in front of them manifests itself as a table. In other words, they share its being discovered as a table. The same thing that those who are together have in common turns out to be the discoveredness, the unconcealment of the entity. As is well known, Heidegger construes the unconcealment of an entity to be the primordial truth in the sense that the unconcealment is an ontological condition of possibility for right and wrong statements about that entity. In the end, what people being together share is nothing but the truth of the entity. The first thesis is that the Being-with is in essence the sharing of truth.[26]

That people are together means that they share at least more than one truth. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the Being-with does not imply the sharing of the whole truth, because it is possible and factual for people being together not to share certain truths. For example, a person may find a rare plant on a high mountain, but not reveal it to anyone, and no other person knows about it. Yet the lucky finder was with other humans in some ways. Even at the time of finding the wild plant, he or she may have been with other people. In this case, he or she did not seem to share the truth of the plant with them, though sharing many other truths. Heidegger, however, points out that the apparent monopoly of truth is the *privative* mode of the ontological sharing of truth, saying that:

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[26] Henceforth by "truth" I am referring to unconcealment of the entity, not the correctness of a statement.

He protects the truth from others, and takes care not to communicate it to others. In this, it is already clear that he shares this truth with others, *but only in the mode of withholding*. And he only shares it with others in this way, because unconcealment of present-at-hand entities is essentially something in common. [...] On the one hand, it is clear that the sharing of such a truth does not mean that others necessarily acquire it explicitly. On the other hand, the fact that someone retains it for himself does not mean that the truth would in fact initially be an exclusive possession. Truth cannot be of that kind because it is *essentially available* to others, and it can never belong to the individual otherwise than through his guarding it from them. [...] what does that mean? This *Dasein* must close itself off. What does it close off? This unconcealment of the present-at-hand entity, [...] this *Dasein* closes off its discovering Being alongside this entity.[27]

The discoveredness of the entity – that is, the truth – is "essentially available" to anyone who understands the Being of entity – namely, to *Dasein*. Therefore, in order to monopolize the truth, there is no other choice than hiding his or her own facing it from others. Even though it can be acquired explicitly by a single person and, in this sense, can be monopolized, the unconcealment of an entity, due to its essential availability to others – that is, its manifestness to them – is imbued with the potential of being shared with others. The second thesis is that truth is essentially something that occurs in common.

Why is the unconcealment of the entity essentially a common act? Heidegger replies that the reason is that *Dasein* discovering the entity is "in itself manifest," and that it is accompanied by "a manifested circuit (*Umkreis von Offenbarkeit*)." *Dasein* forms around itself a space where the entity can be manifested as what it is. Depending on what is involved, such spaces vary in detail and can be narrower or wider accordingly. In addition, the entity is manifested on the whole, so its determination may be "rough and inarticulate."[28] What is most important is the fact that the space in which the unconcealment of entity occurs is "in itself manifest." It is not a place that one person can fence off and prevent others from entering. It can never be owned exclusively.

Heidegger expresses the characteristic of the space as "unconcealment of unconcealment," which means that the fact that entities around me are discovered by me as such-and-such is in turn disclosed to other people.[29] I form a sphere where entities around me are manifest, and this sphere is always open to others, because it is so transparent that it does not need a specific point of entry. The third thesis is that *Dasein* is accompanied by a manifested circuit that is open to all other *Dasein*.

[27] M. HEIDEGGER, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, cit., p. 127f. Translation and emphasis mine.
[28] In order, see *ibidem*, pp. 129, 134, 153. Translation mine.
[29] *Ibidem*, p. 130. Translation mine.

Heidegger offers an interesting example of this duality of unconcealment.[30] Some people look at a farmhouse from a distance, and a shape like a stick emerges from a pasture and goes into a black hole in the front side of the house. Those who see it easily recognize that the figure is a farmer who enters the gate. How was this true judgment possible? It was by no means inferred through distinguishing eyes or hands from the external characteristics of the figure. The judgment was based solely on their observation of the fact that the figure used an entity as a gate to enter the house. When the figure discovering some entity as a door – the first unconcealment – was revealed to those who observed it – the second unconcealment – they regarded the figure as a farmer. In other words, since the space that the figure disclosed – namely, the manifested circuit where the door was discovered as a door – was also disclosed to the observers, they could regard it as being with themselves.

The above-mentioned cases can be re-analyzed according to the third thesis. The reason why the finder had to hide the discovery of the wild plant is that a manifested circuit in which he or she entered was open to others and thus essentially shared by them. The reason why people who faced the sight of the mountain with total ignorance of each other could still be said to be together in some way is that they formed the same manifested circuit. What the person sitting across the table shared with the other person was a space where entities including the table were manifested as such-and-such. In the end, that people are together means ontologically that they share the same manifested space.

Heidegger, on the one hand, writes as if each *Dasein* is accompanied by its own manifested circuit. This reminds us of the Nancy-Schatzkian answer that each discloses his or her own *there* or clearing and that only after their intersection can the world be disclosed in common. However, after introducing the concept of 'manifested circuit,' Heidegger states that "when a *Dasein* comes across another *Dasein*, it steps into a manifested space of another. *More accurately speaking*, their Being alongside [any entities] moves in the *same* manifested circuit."[31]

The first sentence comes close to the Nancy-Schatzkian idea that each person discloses their respective clearing and that, only after meeting each other, do the clearings become intercrossed and overlapped. It is reminiscent of Schatzki's claim that the number of clearings is as many as the number of people and each clearing is 'numerically distinct.' However, Heidegger corrects the first sentence to a "more accurate" expression – namely, that they share the same clearing. As is well known, Heidegger distinguishes strictly between the "equal (*gleich*)" and the "same (*derselbe*)." The former is used for the correspondence among the entities numerically distinguished, and the lat-

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[30] See *ibidem*, pp. 131-132.
[31] *Ibidem*, p. 134. Translation, emphasis and parenthesis mine.

ter is used for one and the same. In the second sentence, Heidegger seems to suggest the fundamental oneness of the primordial clearing.

Heidegger does not refer to the world at all in a long discussion of the relationship between truth and Being-with. However, he equates the manifested circuit with *there*.[32] That the *there* is for Heidegger no different from the world is obvious from *Being and Time*. In this context, the discussion of the relationship between truth and Being-with can be extended to the discussion of the world. Following the third thesis that the manifested circuit is to open to all other *Dasein*, I suggest extending the discussion as follows:

(the fourth thesis) In order for the third thesis to be possible, there must already be a universal open area covering all of the manifested circuit.
(the fifth thesis) The universal open area is the primordial clearing – that is, the world.
(the sixth thesis) Thus, the world is always already universally open to every *Dasein*.

The crucial step is the fourth thesis. In order that a manifested circuit that each person forms around himself or herself can be open to all other people, all people's manifested circuits must belong to one and the same *there*. Let us assume that a certain range of the manifested circuit is formed around me. As the third thesis puts it, the manifested area around me is, as a dually unconcealed space, open to all other people who are capable of understanding the Being of entities. In order for the manifested area around me to be open to others, even though it actually does not overlap with another manifested area, the universal and single *there* covering all local manifested circuits must prevail. In short, a single common world is a necessary condition for a clearing to be essentially open to others.

Each of the manifested circuits is a part of the single *there* that is already ontologically shared. Even before I encountered the finder who hid the rare plant, his or her manifested circuit must have been open to mine. However, that the two separate spaces are already open to each other implies that each of them is part of a larger open area covering them. The reason that the finder concealed his or her discovery from any *Dasein* is that he or she was not confined to his or her own circuit, but had already (i.e., as an ontological entity capable of understanding Being) entered into the vast open terrain that he or she shares with all other *Dasein*.

The manifested circuit around each *Dasein* is grounded ontologically in the vast open terrain in which other *Dasein* have also entered. Each *Dasein* is centered around its manifested circuit, but at the same time it has also already joined the common open terrain. Only by being grounded in the open terrain joined by every *Dasein* can my manifested circuit be open to others.

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[32] *Ibidem*, p. 137.

The duality of unconcealment – namely, that an entity's being discovered by me is essentially revealed to all other *Dasein* – requires the oneness of the common terrain. Therefore, Heidegger says: "[a]s essentially stepped outside, everyone has *already* stepped into the manifested circuit of others. ... They remain in the same sphere of manifestness."[33] The "already" refers to the time before actually meeting a certain person. As long as a person exists as *Dasein*, he or she lives always in the same open area together with all other *Dasein* where entities are discovered as what they are. The same open area is the single *there* – that is, the common world that all of *Dasein* share.

One year later, in the winter semester of 1929/30, Heidegger reemphasized the worldhood of the world. The world is not "significance," but "manifestness of entities as such as a whole."[34] The whole open area, which each manifested circuit presupposes ontologically, is now defined as the world. The relationship between the world and truth, only intimated in *Being and Time,* is established in this lecture.

4. 5. Conclusion: Explaining the Compatibility of My World and the World

It is the essential sharing of truth or the impossibility of its privatization that makes my world compatible with the commonality of the world. The world comprises the entirety of possible truths for all kinds of entities. Since the truth cannot be privatized in nature, the world must be a single entity, which is shared with all other *Dasein*. The openness of the *there* means that the Being of entities is disclosed to all of *Dasein* through the truth. Such a disclosure is, based on the duality of unconcealment, only possible through sharing with others. Because the openness of the *there* is so marked by the sharing of truth, my world is bound to be open to others.

Olafson raised the question of how there can be a single common world if the world is to be disclosed in dependence on the existence of *Dasein* which is characterized by "mineness." However, the world is disclosed to all of *Dasein* in common. My world is part of a jointly disclosed world. It is the key to solving Olafson's question that *Dasein* exist not only individually, but also participate in the openness of the truth jointly.

Each clearing is a local area of the common world. My world is characterized by including among others the areas concealed from the majority of others, since I disclose it according to my life history and situation. Such a concealment does not mean, however, a solipsistic privacy. Even the concealed areas are part of the ontologically shared world. If the world were not open to others, there would be no need at all to conceal my world from others.

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[33] *Ibidem*, p. 138. Translation and emphasis mine.
[34] M. HEIDEGGER, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, cit., p. 412. Translation mine.

The Nancy-Schatzkian idea that each discloses his or her own clearing, and that the common world is established only after their intersection and interminglement, therefore, cannot be endorsed. It does not adequately reflect Heidegger's particular insight into the essential openness of the world. The world is not established by the intersection of each clearing, but the openness of each clearing presupposes the common disclosure of the world. Among the three possibilities Nancy considered, the second one – namely, the unity of the clearing – was closest to what seems to be a more correct answer. Yet, this conclusion is, of course, ontological and is not necessarily linked to totalitarianism.

On the other hand, Olafson's thesis that the clearing is singular, or Dreyfus' thesis that the common world is ontologically prior to my world, is phenomenologically correct. Nonetheless, if they are advanced based on *Being and Time*, they are exegetically at least contestable. The assumptions of that work that the world is woven into the center of the "for-the-sake-of" of each *Dasein*, and that the world is disclosed to *Dasein* by its particular temporalization of temporality, make it difficult to support the ontological priority of the common disclosure of the single world.

These two assumptions gradually disappear from the lectures after the publication of *Being and Time*. In the winter semester of 1928/29, the ontological priority of the common open terrain is suggested based on the duality of unconcealment. In the winter semester of 1929/30, that single open terrain is construed as the world. The worldhood of the world is no longer explained by its existential structure, and the temporality of *Dasein* is not regarded as the basis of world-disclosure. Perhaps this change of thinking would have been a step that eventually led to the "turning (*Kehre*)."

ABSTRACT · According to the early Heidegger, the world is disclosed in dependence on *Dasein*, which is a term for each of us. A question arises as to how the world can be established despite the particular existence of *Dasein*. After reviewing previous discussions of the question, I elucidate the priority of the world over my world based on Heidegger's lecture in 1928/29, which contains a considerable discussion of the relationship between Being-with (*Mitsein*) and truth. According to him, since truth is essentially communal and cannot be privatized, the sphere of truth manifested by a particular *Dasein* is open to all other *Dasein*. This openness signifies, I argue, the ontological priority of an open realm that covers every sphere of truth. This open realm is no different from the world that is ontologically disclosed in common. Based on this common world-disclosure, each *Dasein* discloses its own world according to its life history and situation.