Airwar and Justice: Has Albert Camus a Contribution to Make to Catholic Teaching on War?*

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On a recent British television news programme¹, the political engagement of British theatre was being discussed. The guests were lamenting that unlike the 60’s and 70’s British theatre was now quite uncritical of the political establishment since a new consensus about core values now dominates British political life. One of the guests later commented that his plays were radical, but he had to look towards Europe to find material. His latest production, he told us, was set in the former Yugoslavia were the peoples of that shattered land had perpetrated the worst outbreak of barbarism since WWII. There is no doubt that theatre can play a role as a structure of conscience, indeed, Albert Camus’ own works and productions provide perhaps the finest example of such a role for theatre. Yet, the sad fact is that British theatre, and cultural commentary in the West generally, is bound to fail to stir conscience on these sad events: at least, it is bound to fail unless it theorizes the contribution to barbarism made by the Western “liberal democracies” through their strategy of airwar during the Kosovo conflict². At least, this is what Albert Camus would have thought.

Camus’ late work, The Rebel, thought by Camus to be his best work³, broke

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¹ Newsnight, BBC2, Friday, February 18th, 2001.
² This same myopia is evident in “War Without Risk,” Times Higher Education Supplement, December 2000, Millennium Magazine, p. 35; hereafter cited as THES.
new ground. Not merely was it a departure for Camus’ corpus, but it reintroduced into modern political and moral philosophy a long forgotten genre: the tract on homicide. To my knowledge, no modern author after the early modern contributions of the Spanish school of “Second Scholasticism” wrote a systematic work on homicide. If one of the greats from Descartes to Hegel did produce such a work, then it has been forgotten, as recent scholarship makes painfully obvious. Yet, why should Catholics be interested in Camus’ thoughts on the subject of homicide and their application to Kosovo? Camus was hardly a Catholic thinker, and are there not resources enough in the Catholic tradition? There are at least two reasons to go to an “outside source,” as it were. Sadly, Catholic intellectuals are yet to address the issue of the lessons to be learnt from the Kosovo war and this is perhaps because some confusion appears to have entered the Church’s thoughts about war. The Constitution on the Church in the Modern World called for a “completely fresh reappraisal of war”, but it is unclear that this has happened. In an otherwise laudatory biography, George Weigel has noted that amongst all the intellectual triumphs of John Paul II’s papacy the only singular failure has been in the realm of thought about war. A second reason to use Camus, and despite the fact that I will claim that Camus’ theory of homicide restates Aquinas’ theory of proportionality, is that Camus provides a brilliant, and unique, theological insight into the true nature of so-called “zero-casualty” warfare: Romanticism’s rebellion against God, and its cult of Lucifer.

This essay aims then to (1) demonstrate that the air campaign over Kosovo was immoral and thus unjust; (2) to show the structural similarity between “zero-casualty” airwar and Romanticism; using Camus’ reflections on Romanticism (3)

4 For an example of the quality and range of these works, see F. de Vitoria, O.P. On Homicide, trans. and ed. John P. Doyle (Marquette University Press, 1997); hereafter cited as OH.
5 One such work is Richard Norman’s Ethics, Killing & War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). This book re-invents the wheel as it labours to generate a theory of homicide without reference to any of the systematic studies of the Middle Ages or those of Spain in the Early Modern period.
6 On Camus’ recent re-emergence as an intellectual presence in France after years of obscurity, see “Le triomphe de Camus,” Le nouvel Observateur, June, 1994, pp. 5-13.
8 Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, para. 80.
to cast doubt on the claim of Michael Ignatieff\textsuperscript{10} that this innovation in warfare will be less destructive of life than more traditional means; and (4) conclude with the argument that such warfare is part and parcel of the culture of death. A significant indication of the cultural dimension of such warfare, I will argue, is that Action films, like airwar, are suffused with Romantic motifs.

1. The Air Campaign over Kosovo

“Zero-casualty” airwar is, for some commentators, simply a reflection of the zero-tolerance for casualties that Western populations have for the consequences of warfare\textsuperscript{11}. As Ignatieff points out in his \textit{Virtual War}, this view relies on a very particular “moral” calculus on the part of Western society, “preserving the lives of their all-volunteer service professionals was a higher priority than saving innocent foreign civilians.” (VW, 62; 104-105) Of course, this understanding of the sensibilities of the West, and thus the political suitability of “zero-casualty” warfare, has its detractors in the military. There is serious debate within military circles concerning just how future wars should be fought, whether on land or by air\textsuperscript{12}. Those who favour airwar approvingly tout what appears to be its very least moral aspect: you can kill the enemy before you send in soldiers on the ground, before combat\textsuperscript{13}. Others, including General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander during Kosovo, distance themselves from any such model of warfare. In Ignatieff’s words, Clark came to the conclusion during the war that, “the air campaign alone could neither halt ethnic cleansing nor avoid mounting civilian casualties.” (VW, 62) Clark’s unease stems from the logic of “zero-casualty” airwar: “To target effectively you have to fly low. If you fly low, you lose pilots. Fly high and you get civilians.” (VW, 62)

This being the full understanding of the nature of “zero-casualty” warfare, the Western powers were engaged in the pursuit of a just end\textsuperscript{14} by a clearly unjust means. The doctrine of double-effect, nicely outlined by Aquinas (\textit{Summa theologica} Ila IIae, q. 64, a. 7)\textsuperscript{15}, requires that in the choice of means for the conduct

\textsuperscript{10}M. IGNATIEFF, \textit{Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond} (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000), p. 118; hereafter cited as VW.
\textsuperscript{12}“Land Warfare,” \textit{The Economist}, November 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2000, pp. 29-33; hereafter cited as EC.
\textsuperscript{13}David Ochmanek of RAND comments: “The enemy’s army should be already destroyed before we get on to the ground.” (EC, 33).
\textsuperscript{14}I am persuaded by Vitoria’s justifications for such interventions in principle (OH, p. 227, n. 193). Whether the Kosovo intervention was itself justified may well be doubtful. For a Catholic commentary that doubts a just end was pursued, see R.J. NEUHAUS, “The Clinton Era, At Home and Abroad,” \textit{First Things}, May, 1999, pp. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{15}Throughout, I shall be using the version of Thomas’s text that appears with Vitoria’s commentary in the edition of Doyle: see n. 4 above.
of war the killing of the innocent must not be directly intended. In the Kosovo warrooms, lawyers were used to judge whether the targets selected by the Western military for possible attack were compatible with the Geneva Conventions on war (VW, 100; 197). Nevertheless, this petina of legality cannot mask the reality that the very means of attack meant that consciously and intentionally the lethal risk to combatants was given a priority over the lethal risk to the innocent: “zero-casualty” airwar is a simple inversion of natural law doctrine concerning just war. Indeed, the most telling blow of the war was based on just such a calculation of risks. The central power grid of Belgrade was a target of undoubted military importance but of even greater civilian importance. Instead of directly attacking combatants, the West’s intent for this bombing was to immobilize Serbian troop movements by disabling the command systems of the Serbian military. Destroying the power grid, however, also, “meant taking out the power to the hospitals, babies’ incubators, water-pumping stations.” (VW, 108) Whether any civilians in fact died as a consequence of this strike does not alter the fact that as a matter of policy the lethal risk to innocents was given a lower priority than the lethal risk to combatants, and perversely, in this case, even lower priority than the enemy combatants! However vile and murderous was the conduct of Milosevic and his forces, and however rightly condemned, his actions must not hide from view the intentional, and multiple, homicides of the Western powers: our leaders and our troops are guilty of (and are we complicit in?) war crimes. Reading Camus, we can reach the conclusion that such a perverse political and military doctrine does not reflect a risk averse culture but rather part of the West’s contemporary theological character: Diabolism.

2. Zero-casualty Warfare and Romanticism

Ignatieff is of the opinion that the Kosovo war was the first post-modern war.  

"We live our lives in language and thus in representation," (VW, 214) and the war was no different, explains Ignatieff: the war was conducted on screens, whether television, computer, bombing instrument panels, or video playbacks of bomb strikes. Thus, Kosovo was a virtual war for all concerned except those, as Ignatieff points out, on the ground being struck by munitions. Certainly, so far as the West and its military were concerned, the war was virtual. Camus would not disagree with this analysis, I think, save to point out that if Kosovo was the first post-modern war, the script at least was thoroughly modern: Kosovo was the first

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16For the different judicial standards applied to an enemy of the West in respect of its war crimes and the (should such ever even be conceived) war crimes of our own soldiers and political leaders, see VW, 128.

fully Romantic war. The war was not premised on the West’s “high-tech” character, but, as Camus helps us to see, on Romanticism’s appropriation of theology.

Camus’ treatment of Romanticism, theology, and homicide is part of a general cultural theory about Western history. In this history, the French Revolution stands as the beginning of a violent cultural struggle between justice and grace. It marks the age of rebellion in which various intellectual movements, all, in their deepest essence, being theological, have set themselves in opposition to God and the Church: thus de Sade, the Revolutionaries themselves, Nietzsche, Fascism, Surrealism, Marxism, and more. Curiously, as Camus points out, while these movements have all sought to replace God and the Church as the custodians of human salvation, each and everyone one of them has developed a logic which exults violence against humans. Horrified by a Church whose God dispensed grace to some and not to others, the theorists of rebellion sought to deliver justice for all. All have seen the need to dis-incarnate God (and therewith grace) as a pre-condition to their delivering universal justice. With de Sade, Camus tells us, the attempt to remove God is made by denying the natural law and thus, murdering the innocent, torture, and sodomy become “licit.” (R, 36-47) Saint-Just seeks to dis-incarnate God not by dismissing the moral law but by denying original sin. As humans are naturally good, and since there is no original sin, there is no need for grace. Confronted with refractory citizens, those who failed (for whatever reason) to conform to the moral law, the Terror, Camus argues, was the only logical response of the Revolutionaries: mercy, in Saint-Just’s eyes, was immoral because rooted in grace. Unable to forgive, the Revolutionaries were led by the logic of their own position to execute all who did not realize human impeccability. (R, 112-132)

Though Camus only devotes about eight pages to Romanticism, his analysis is amongst the most trenchant of the book. Neither rejecting the law as in de Sade nor denying human moral ineptitude as with Saint-Just, the Romantic rebels against God by seeking to possess His role as the master of life and death (OH, 93; 214, n. 76). The Church, ever-mindful of Satan’s wish to possess such a role, has always insisted upon the authority of the natural law, the law that refuses any such role for man, angel, or State. The Romantic, however, will exercise the moral law since God, through His grace, has seen fit to allow some of the infractions against the law to go unpunished. Now, the rule of law will be insisted upon in all of its universality, purity, and force. In Romanticism, writes Camus, “hatred of death and of injustice will lead, therefore, if not to the exercise, at least to the vindication, of evil and murder.” (R, 47)

Writing in the 1950’s, Camus saw Romanticism solely as a literary rebellion, “useful for adventures of the imagination.” (R, 47) The pages of classic Romantic texts (Sir Walter Scott’s, for example) are filled with “the romantic

18 For a comparable analysis by a contemporary of Camus, see G. FESSARD, S.J., Par-delà le fascisme et le communisme (Paris: FNAC, 1945).
hero,” who, writes Camus, “considers himself compelled to do evil by his nostal-
gia for an unrealizable good.” (R, 48) Certainly, viewing airwar as in some sense
literary, as Camus would encourage us, is strengthened by recent military esti-
mates that throughout the Kosovo war perhaps only between 8 and 10 Serbian
tanks were actually destroyed19. It is far from clear that the ineffectiveness of
airwar in Kosovo has in any way dented the prestige of zero-casualty “combat”
in Western eyes. And nor is its continued ineffectiveness likely to do so. For, in
Camus’ analysis, Romantic rebellion is a dominant form of the West’s self-
understanding, and I would argue, “zero-casualty” airwar demonstrates that
Romanticism is now a primary structure of our action, as well.

Romanticism is typified, says Camus, by “the criminal with the heart of gold,
and the kind brigand,” whose “works are bathed in blood.” (R, 50) On our
behalf, the West’s airmen were asked to pursue a good intention but through an
objectively evil means, and so under the guise of doing good, murder became
legitimate. What more perverse inversion could Lucifer desire: to be a bringer of
death cloaked in God’s own mantle? And murder is made legitimate here
because of a manner of “combat” in which one kills without offering one’s self
to the other to kill. Scripture has Lucifer killing by proxy (1 John, 3, 11-12) and,
of course, stresses his immortality (“He was a murderer from the beginning…”
[John 8, 44-45]). For this reason, Camus favours a return to an historical rebel
like Spartacus (R, 105-111) who wished to fight his Roman masters and thus, “to
die, but in absolute equality.” (R, 110) Hence, of the rebel, he says: “If he finally
kills himself, he will accept death.” (R, 286) Camus’ theoretical alternative to the
Romantic hero is a re-statement of the law of proportionality that is at the root of
all just war theory.

In natural law, the homicide of war is justified on the basis of legitimate self-
defence. What combat has traditionally meant — but which the logic of “zero-
casualty” airwar does not respect — is “a basic equality of moral risk: kill or be
killed.” (VW, 161). As Thomas documents in the very heart of his article on the
lawful homicide that might issue from self-defence, the “jurists” have noted, “it
is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a
blameless defence.” (ST IIaIIae, q. 64, a. 7; my italics) The proportionality —
guaranteed by the clause highlighted — that Camus insists upon, and which is in
full accordance with Thomas, Vitoria and the Church’s traditional teaching, is
simply abandoned in “zero-casualty” warfare. The innocent must die because
without the intimacy of combat the killing necessarily becomes indiscriminate.
Strangely, the savagery of close-quarters combat is a consequence of proportion-
ality, and thus a mark of justice. The alternative proffered by “zero-casualty” air-
war bears within it a deeper savagery, perhaps. Von Balthasar has argued that to
be a person requires “a form of sympathy or at least natural inclination and

19THES, p. 35. For the aircrews’ knowledge that at the time they were having next to no
impact on the situation on the ground, see some of their comments in VW, 105.

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involvement” with another person; and approvingly, he notes Ratzinger’s position that Diabolism is marked by a fostering of “the decomposition, the disintegration of being a person”\textsuperscript{20}. Does the very deepest level of savagery during the Kosovo war emerge in a means of combat, promoted by the West, in which involvement with the other is severed and therewith the personhood of all concerned?

3. Zero-casualty Warfare and the Intensification of Killing

The “zero-casualty” style of air war over Kosovo is already known as “spectacle warfare”\textsuperscript{21}, a style of warfare that does “not demand blood and sacrifice.” (VW, 111) And once more, a stunning parallel with Camus’ analysis of Romanticism emerges. Horrified by the injustice of death, the Romantic rejects death but in a wholly contradictory fashion. Laying claim to a new, more intense life, the Romantic cultivates magnificence (R, 51) which requires that the hero must be seen. Thus, Camus’ comment: “[the Romantic hero] can only be sure of his own existence by finding it in the expression of other’ faces. Other people are his mirror.” (R, 51) With aerial combat, of course, the mirror is the multiple systems that re-present the image of the combat: the recordings, playbacks, news footage, etc. Camus lets us understand then why the post-modern conditions of representation (well documented by Ignatieff) are not accidental to the possibility of “zero-casualty” warfare, but constitutive. Recognizing this deals a terrible blow to a commentator like Ignatieff. Ignatieff sees the recording of the combat as a means of accountability. The killing with impunity that typifies “zero-casualty” air war is controlled and reduced, thinks Ignatieff, through the means of representation; they establish a record of combat, able to be judged. It is for this reason that Ignatieff favours such combat, for, at the end of the day, he thinks, the sum total of homicide will be less (VW, 161-162): the West cannot be seen to be, his word, “murderous”\textsuperscript{22}. Yet, if Camus is correct, the imaging of the “combat” does not moderate air war but exacerbate it: the Romantic’s desire for magnificence is stimulated and satisfied. On Camus’ analysis, we can expect more killing – all rebel logics which ignore proportionality inevitably lead to such – not less.


\textsuperscript{21}THES, p. 34; cf. VW, 191.

\textsuperscript{22}Commenting that Milosevic’s strategy to beat the Nato air war was not to fight the aircraft but to ensure that the consequences to the civilian population of the airwar was made readily available to the Western media, Ignatieff writes, “he gambled his regime… on the assumption that the Western public would not allow an air campaign to become murderous.” (VW, 52).
4. Airwar and the Culture of Death

“Spectacle warfare” is hardly a surprise, therefore. Behind it lies a dominant theological attitude, the rejection of God, the cult of Satan and of death, and one of its species is a pervasive motif in modern Western consciousness, the hero who enforces the moral law as “Lethal Weapon.” It is surely no coincidence that our culture’s film presentations of police-enforcement are, like the Kosovo police-enforcement of the moral law, saturated with Romantic motifs. A central theme in Romanticism, according to Camus, is that “bloodshed is on its way to being acceptable” (R, 49) and do not the Action heroes of today’s Hollywood films pursue this theme? The heroes of such films are all enforcers of the law who are nevertheless unrestrained by the law and in so doing claim for themselves the role of master of life and death. All such heroes are judge, jury, witness, and executioner (for they never seek to apprehend their victims) and, in Diabolical fashion, they create more bloodshed than originally found. Thus their names: ‘Lethal weapon;’ ‘Die Hard;’ ‘Enforcer;’ and, of course, the one who is ‘Licensed to Kill,’ James Bond. They are all, as Wesley Clark noted of the airmen over Kosovo, put in an “impossible position,” that is, “to wage a war that was clean yet lethal.” (VW, 111) Impossible, indeed: for they are lethal and criminal. These characters are identical to the airmen: never dying (hence the sequels) they kill with impunity at the very moment that they enforce the moral law.

Once the similarities between Romanticism, “spectacle warfare,” and Action films have been identified, it becomes quite plausible to see the presence of the same culture of death in all three. Acknowledging such, makes it easier to understand how an informed commentator like Ignatieff can dismiss in a paragraph the moral issues involved in such airwar and reduce the matter so: “The real question is whether risk-free warfare can work.” For he takes it as a matter of course that, “no commander worth his stars will do anything other than seek victory with minimum loss to his own troops.” (VW, 162) Or, as he puts it mockingly, do “we have to lay down our lives in order to prove our moral seriousness?” (VW, 162) Well, yes, we do. The natural law insists that no commander can seek to minimize his soldiers’ lives by the directly willed homicide of the innocent. (Recall Thomas’ and the jurists’ clause: “it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defence.”) Thus, indeed, to prove our moral seriousness, more, to be just, it is incumbent upon the West to lay down the lives of its soldiers, and for its culture to transform the sensibilities of its citizenries so as to be able to sustain sacrifice.

23Think here of Clint Eastwood’s character, ‘Dirty Harry,’ or Mel Gibson’s, ‘Martin Ricks.’
24It is probably contrary to the natural law for one person to perform all these roles. See OH, p. 157.
25De Gaulle’s words now appear prophetic: “International law would be worthless without soldiers to back it.”
That the distinction between combatant and innocent has been utterly obscured in Ignatieff’s mind (“Interventions which minimize casualties to both sides must be the better strategy” [VW, 162; 170]) is, in Camus’ analysis, the deepest, most troubling aspect of Romanticism. “The romantic hero,” Camus writes, “first of all brings about the profound and, so to speak, religious blending of good and evil. This type of hero is “fatal” because fate confounds good and evil without man being able to prevent it.” (R, 48)26 Thus it is that Ignatieff, at the end of the day, is less concerned with morality and more with “what works.” But also, Ignatieff reveals, in a luminous manner, what is of such concern to John Paul II: the contemporary Western confusion in conscience between good and evil, innocence and guilt27. Certainly, Ignatieff does not believe any moral Rubicon was crossed in Kosovo (VW, 184)28, though he does think Kosovo may have made such a crossing more likely in the future (tellingly, it will be the Americans who do this, and not, to his mind at least, the more sophisticated Europeans).

To conclude: The lessons of Kosovo will, of course, be learnt slowly, or, God forbid, not at all. The idea remains, even amidst critical discussions of Kosovo, that, for example, the United States is the only country that could fight a war for a long period of time. Kosovo surely showed, however, that war is a “low-tech,” and precisely not a “high-tech” affair. Some do appreciate this29. There are implications for justice, morale and culture. The implications of justice have been discussed: such airwar is unjust and it leads to multiple homicides of the innocent that cannot be defended by the application of double-effect theory. Such airwar, therefore, makes criminals of the West’s pilots, and their political masters. Though seldom mentioned, one can only guess at the problems for morale in the air forces of the Western powers. Not merely are the pilots refused the status of warrior but they are ordered to conduct themselves in a manner contrary to the natural law and this they do intuit. As the Church has always maintained, the natural law is present to conscience, and such does appear to be the case here. Wesley Clark is reported as saying of his aircrews that they were unhappy with

26For this religious blending of good and evil consider the preternatural dimension of films starring Clint Eastwood, ‘Pale Rider,’ and ‘High Plains Drifter.’


28Although, please note his final words at VW, pp. 214-215: “We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword. In so doing we misdescribe ourselves as we misdescribe the instruments of death.” A bit like the aircrews themselves, Ignatieff seems to intuit that something is seriously amiss in zero-casualty warfare.

29For example, General Ronald Griffiths, quoting approvingly an historian of the Korean War: for effective combat, at the end of the day, you must do what, “the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud.” (EC, 29) By contrast, Ignatieff does not grasp this: see his hard-to-believe pages, VW, 169-170.
the conduct of the war in Kosovo: “it was a sort of an unnatural act for airmen to fight a ground war without a ground component.” (VW, 98; my italics).

Interestingly, Ignatieff points out that development of “zero-casualty” warfare, in which the concept of the warrior that has dominated Western society is gutted of all its significance and resonance, tracks closely sociological evidence that the culture of the soldier is increasingly incomprehensible to Western societies. (VW, 186-188) And yet, if Huizinga is correct, not merely does “zero-casualty” warfare mean the end of the warrior, and therefore the end of justice in war, but it also signifies the end of mercy. In his classic analysis of the dissolution of the Middle Ages, Huizinga argued that the knight as a cultural form promoted an ideal – often not lived up to – but an ideal that nevertheless civilized the Western world. Huizinga identifies pride as the leading characteristic of the medieval warrior. Such pride30, of course, ensured that only other combatants were worthy opponents, and that killing the innocent was beneath the knight. Thus, argues Huizinga, principles of honour, loyalty, self-respect, and rules of virtue, blended with the developing laws of war and the two reinforced one another. The result was the savagery of war and ideals of justice, protection for the oppressed, right conduct and mercy for the innocent31. “Zero-casualty” airwar is neither just nor merciful to the innocent. Its diabolical inspiration, in Camus’ analysis, seamlessly adds to John Paul II’s analysis of a growing culture of death32 in which the innocent are destroyed through the lust to dominate. “Zero-casualty” warfare is a manifestation of the city of man, dominated by the lust to dominate, and its victims are justice and mercy. Strange to say, and yet perhaps not so strange, if there is to be war, then for war to contribute to a culture of life, airmen and soldiers must be ready to be killed as well as to kill.

30I do not see any conflict between this pride – glorie is perhaps the better word – and Catholicism. Cardinal Richelieu and De Gaulle were both devout Catholics, as well as statesmen and soldiers who were animated by the desire for glorie. On the culture of glorie in France in the seventeenth century – and the role St. Francis de Sales played in generating it – see, A. LEVI, Cardinal Richelieu and the Making of France (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2000), pp. 152-155. For a Catholic who thinks there is a conflict, see P. MANENT, The City of Man (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).


32It also supports the contention of Neuhaus that liberal democracies pervert themselves when they take no account of the intellectual and moral heritage of orthodox Christianity. See R.J. NEUHAUS, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984).