¿Esencia y nominalismo? Algunas críticas y respuestas en torno a la noción de esencia

Zaida Espinosa Zárate


Sumario: 1. La posición antiesencialista: la concepción de la mente en la ontología de Reinhardt Grossmann. 2. La crítica grossmanniana a la ontología aristotélica y tomista. 3. La posición esencialista: El sentido más propio de sustancia como forma formarum en la filosofía de Inciarte. 4. Respuesta desde la noción de acto a las críticas de Grossmann a las ontologías aristotélica y tomista.

Abstract: As the concept of essence continues to be a polemical one in metaphysics, this paper is aimed to shed some light on the problems that have been raised around it by contrasting the views of two contemporary and analytical philosophers, Reinhardt Grossmann and Fernando Inciarte, who represent opposite positions concerning the question of substance. Analogy, the awareness of the different levels in which philosophical investigation can take place, or the understanding of the last form in living beings as actuality – that leads to its interpretation as a forma formarum –, which are operative throughout the entire philosophy of Inciarte, provide us with convenient tools in order to respond to some objections that have already become common places against essentialism among some analytical philosophers.

Keywords: essence, essentialism, nominalism, substance, form, actuality, analogy, bare particular.